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[TAN SOO HUAT v. PEDRO ONGWICO](https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1ca7?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. 43762, Oct 31, 1936 ]

TAN SOO HUAT v. PEDRO ONGWICO +

DECISION

63 Phil. 746

[ G. R. No. 43762, October 31, 1936 ]

TAN SOO HUAT, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO ONGWICO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. MONICO UY YT, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEASED IGNACIO UY QUIMCO, INTER- VENOR AND APPELLEE.

D E C I S I O N

IMPERIAL, J.:

Tan Soo  Huat,  plaintiff,  obtained  a money  judgment against Pedro F. Ongwico, defendant, in civil case No. 41907 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.   On the issuance of a writ of execution the  provincial  sheriff of Tayabas levied on two parcels of land belonging to the defendant and sold them  to Ignacio Uy  Quimco,  as the highest bidder  for P2,487.65.  Under  section 463  of the Code of Civil Procedure,  certificates  of sale  dated September  13 and December 9,1933, were issued to the vendee, subject to the right of repurchase within one  year as provided in the aforecited section and in sections 464 and 465 of the same Code.

The period for redemption expired and neither the judgment debtor nor any  other person had repurchased the property.  The purchaser having died, his judicial administrator, Monico Uy Yt, filed  a motion in the case asking that the provincial sheriff be ordered to issue to him the final certificates of sale pursuant to  section 466 of said Code and to place him in possession of the property.  The defendant challenged the motion in writing alleging that the court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter involved therein.  The latter,  however, after trial, granted the motion  and  ordered the provincial sheriff to issue the final certificates of sale and to place  the movant in possession  of the property purchased by  the deceased.  Having presented a motion for reconsideration which was denied, the defendant brought this appeal.

Defendant's brief assigns two errors, namely, that the court went against the  law in ordering  the  provincial sheriff to yield  possession to  the movant of the  property purchased  by his predecessor at the public sale, and  in denying his motion for  reconsideration.

Defendant insists that the court was without jurisdiction to order the sheriff to  place the movant in possession  of tile  property  sold.  Without  pointing out  any applicable law, defendant  cites American  authorities to  the  effect that in the absence of any legal rule, the purchaser cannot go upon the  real property purchased at a judicial sale, but  should  bring a separate action for the recovery  of ownership or for ejectment, as the case may be.

In Pabico vs. Ong  Pauco  (43 Phil.,  572),  Flores  vs. Lim  (50 Phil.,  738), and Powell vs. National Bank (54 Phil., 54), we have held, contrary to the ruling in Diaz vs. Azcune (31 Phil., 213),  that in  this jurisdiction the purchaser at a sheriff's sale of real property is not entitled to have  possession thereof within  the year fixed by law for its redemption; but this  case is not applicable  to the case at  hand,  because the period  of redemption has  already expired,  and the movant is to be placed in possession after the issuance and delivery of the final certificates of sale.  The form of the deed  of sale found  in section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure says in part that by  virtue of said deed the purchaser is entitled to have and to hold the purchased property.  The, in our opinion, means that the purchaser is entitled  to go immediately upon the real property and that it is the sheriff's inescapable duty to place him in such possession.

There  is  no law in this jurisdiction  whereby the purchaser at a sheriff's sale of  real property is  obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the one-year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriff's final certificate of sale.  There is neither legal ground nor reason of public policy precluding the  court  from ordering the  sheriff in this case to yield possession of the property purchased at public auction where it appears  that the judgment  debtor is the one in possession  thereof and no rights  of third persons are  involved.

In view of the  fact that the period of redemption has expired,  that the right to redeem has not been exercised, and that the judgment debtor, and not a third  person, is in possession of the  real property  sold,  we hold that the movant is entitled to the  issuance of the deeds of sale and to the possession prayed  for,  not being obliged to bring a separate action for possession.

Being  founded  upon the same grounds which we held untenable,  the court properly denied the motion for reconsideration.

Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs in this instance to the  defendant-appellant.   So ordered.

Avanceña,  C.  J.,  Villa-Real,  Abad  Santos, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.

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