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[LEVY HERMANOS v. SIMEON C. CAPULE](https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1c7b?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. 44304, Oct 27, 1936 ]

LEVY HERMANOS v. SIMEON C. CAPULE +

DECISION

63 Phil. 624

[ G. R. No. 44304, October 27, 1936 ]

LEVY HERMANOS, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SIMEON C. CAPULE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

AVANCEƃ'A, C.J.:

This is an action for  the recovery  of a  certain sum of money.  The decision rendered orders the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,310.63, with interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum from August 23, 1934, the date of the  filing of  the complaint,  until  fully paid, plus the additional sum of P41.45, with legal interest thereon from said date,  until  fully paid, with the costs.   The case is now before this court upon appeal from the foregoing decision.

On May 31, 1933, the plaintiff Levy  Hermanos, Inc., sold an  Essex  sedan  terraplane to  the  defendant Simeon C. Capule, for  the  sum  of P1,900.  The defendant made  a cash payment of P250 on account of  the  purchase price thereof, and for the balance of P1,650  he executed in favor of the plaintiff a promissory note for P100 and another for P1,550 payable  on June 15, 1933, and  May 31, 1934, respectively.   To  secure  the  payment  of  the   balance  in question,  the defendant  mortgaged said  automobile,  the mortgage thereon having been duly registered.  By reason of payments subsequently  made  by  the  defendant,  the amount of the debt was reduced to P1,571.63.   To expedite payment of said balance, the defendant, on January 3,1934, issued another promissory note for  the amount thereof (P1,571.63) at the same rate of interest, with the following note:
"This promissory note supersedes the one made by me on May 31,1933, and due on May 31,1934, the present promissory note being,  ifso facto, secured by the same mortgage securing the former, which mortgage shall continue in full force and effect  for all legal ends  and purposes."
Payments were made later, reducing the defendants obligation to the amount which he  is ordered to pay by the lower court.

The only thing sought  in this appeal is to have Act No. 4122 applied to the case and that the defendant be absolved from the complaint upon delivery  of the automobile purchased and mortgaged to the plaintiff.

The automobile was sold to the defendant on May 31,1933 and  the mortgage thereon was  constituted  on said date. Act No. 4122 took effect only on December 9, 1933, that is, after the  consummation  of the  transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant, which gave rise to this action. Consequently, Act No. 4122 is not applicable to this case.

However, the appellant contends that said transactions of sale and mortgage of the automobile were novated on January 3, 1934, when the defendant replaced the two promissory notes with  the one made by him on said date, while Act No. 4122 was already in force, thus making it applicable to the  contract so novated.  This court finds this petition unfounded.

The extension of the promissory note on January 3,1934, cannot be considered a novation of the transactions of May 31, 1933, because it refers to the same debt, although said debt had been reduced by payments made on account thereof.  In fact the only thing done was to transfer the evidence of said  indebtedness to another document.   It was merely a substitution of one document by another on the same transaction.  It is true that different terms more advantageous to the payment thereof  than those formerly agreed upon have been stipulated, but such fact does not imply novation. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 19, 1894.)

This court having arrived at the conclusion that Act No. 4122 is  not applicable to the  present  case, without discussing the other questions raised, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs to the  appellant.  So ordered.

Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.

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