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[MATEO C. SANCHEZ v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS](https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1be6?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. 43094, Aug 31, 1936 ]

MATEO C. SANCHEZ v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS +

DECISION

63 Phil. 378

[ G. R. No. 43094, August 31, 1936 ]

MATEO C. SANCHEZ, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, MARTINAARIZALETA ET AL., OPPOSITORS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

LAUREL, J.:

On January 9, 1932, Mateo C.  Sanchez filed with  the Court of First Instance of Masbate an application for the registration of three  parcels of land situated in the barrio of Uson, municipality of Dimasalang, Province of Masbate, described  in  the plan (Exhibit  A) and in the technical description (Exhibit A-1) attached to the application.  The application was opposed  by the Director of Lands on the ground that the said parcels of land are public lands and that the petitioner  does not possess any title fit for registration  ; by the Director  of Forestry on the ground that portions thereof are  public forests; and by Martina Arizaleta and Jose, Isidro and Francisco Moraza who claimed lot No. 1 indicated in the plan.  The oppositions filed by the last-named  persons and by the Director of Forestry were later on withdrawn.

On October 8, 1934, the trial court rendered a decision overruling the  opposition of the Director  of Lands and ordering the registration  of the three parcels of land in question in favor of the conjugal partnership of  Mateo C. Sanchez and Friscila Zamora subject to a right of way indicated by the red  line  in  Exhibit 1 of the Bureau of Forestry.

On December 12, 1934,  the provincial fiscal of Masbate, on behalf  of the Director of Lands  and the Director of Forestry, filed a motion for new trial on the ground that the decision of the trial court was contrary to law and the weight  of the evidence, which motion was set for hearing on December 22,  1934. On December 15, 1934, prior to the date set for the hearing of the motion  for new trial, the provincial fiscal of Masbate, on behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of  Forestry,  filed the bill  pf exceptions in this  case which was approved by  the trial court on January  7,  1935.

It is  admitted by the appellant Director of Lands  that the provincial fiscal of Masbate who represented him, filed the bill of exceptions  while the motion for new trial was still pending resolution by the trial court. The presentation of  the bill  of exceptions  prior to the resolution of a motion  for new trial  has  the effect of withdrawing such motion  for new trial.  (Conspecto vs. Fruto [1915],  31 Phil., 144,.147, cited with approval in Dimaliwat vs. Dimaliwat [1931],  55 Phil., 673, 679; Heirs  of  Advincula w. Imperial [1932],   56   Phil., 837;  Laxamana vs. Carlos 11932],-57 Phil., 722, 725, 726.)  The fact that the case before us is one of registration is immaterial because the rule with reference to the order of filing the motion for new trial,  exception,  appeal and bill of exceptions is the same in ordinary civil actions and in registration proceedings. (Laxamana vs. Carlos, supra, citing sec. 14, Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 1108, and Director of Lands vs. Court  of First Instance of  Tarlac  [1928],  51 Phil., 805.)  It is well-settled that in order that the evidence adduced  before the trial court  may be reviewed by this court it  is necessary, under section 497, subsection 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, (a) that the excepting party file in the trial court a motion for new trial on the ground that the  evidence was insufficient to justify the decision; (b) that the said motion be overruled by the trial judge; and  (c)  that due exception be taken to the overruling of the motion.   (See Lopez vs. Orozco [1908], 11  Phil., 53, 54; De la Rama vs. De la Rama  [1906], 201 U. S., 303; 11 Phil., 746, 751; Lazarte  vs. Nolan [1921], 42 Phil., 563, 566, citing Singayan vs. Mabborang [1908], 10 Phil., 601, Sandeliz  vs. Reyes [1909], 12 Phil., 506, Buencamino vs. Soriano  [1915],  29 Phil.,  230, and Layda vs. Legazpi [1918], 39 PhiL, 83; Granados  and Granados vs. BandeIaria  [1923], 45 Phil., 505, 507-509 and cases cited; Dais vs. Torres and Ibañez [1933], 57 Phil., 897, 904.)  It has also been held that the motion and exception should be incorporated in the bill of exceptions  (Rubert and  Guamis vs. Luengo and Martinez [1907], 8 Phil., 732) and that in his brief the appellant should assign  errors raising questions of fact (Granados and Granados vs. Bandelaria, supra; Dais  vs. Torres and Ibanez, supra; Enriquez vs. Enriquez [1907], 8 Phil., 565, 566; Capellania de Tambobong vs. Antonio [1907], 8 Phil, 683, 684; Paterno vs. City of Manila [1910], 17 PhiL, 26-29;  Santiago vs. Felix [1913], 24 Phil., 378, 383,  384) and cite the pages of the record where evidence relied upon may be found.   (Palarca vs. Baguisi  [1918], 38 Phil., 177,  178.)  We  are, therefore, constrained to accept the findings of fact made by the trial judge.

Even  accepting,  however, the facts found by the trial judge, we do not feel justified  in granting to the applicant, Mateo C. Sanchez, more land than what his title calls for.

The findings of fact of the lower court are contained in the following paragraph of its decision:
"Se ha demonstrado po las pruebas de solicitante, a satisfaction del Juzgado, que desde elano 1886 Juan Perez de Tagle estaba en possesion de los tres lotes de terreno cuyo registro se solicita, y desde al ano 1889 hasta 1894 se han tomado los pasos por el mismo para adquirir dichos terrenos po compra del Estado, habiendo sido dichas parcelas medidas y tasadas por la inspeccion General de Montes (exhibits B y B-1); que en 1896, dichos tres lotes de terreno, que forman una sola parcela, fueron vendidos por Juan Perez de Tagle a favor de Dolores Ramirez; que a la muerte esta, occurida en 1904, le heredo y le sucedio en la posession su hija Remedios Medina, quien, a su vez, en 120 de Abril de 1917 lo vendio, con consentimiento de su esposo, el testigo Antero Zafra, a favor de Jose Y. de Egurrola (Exhibit C), y ests a su vez, en 10 de septiembre de 1921, lo traspaso en venta a favor del aqui solicitante Mateo C. Sanchez y que tanto  la posession de este asi como la de sus antecesores sobre el terreno en cuestion, ha sido siempre quita, publica, continuada y adversa y en concepto de dueno, habiendolo dedicado desde entonces hasta ahora para pasto de ganados."

Exhibit B-1 is entitled "expediente general referente a la enajenacion en publica subasta de terreno situado  en la jurisdiccion del Pueblo de Uson (Masbate y Ticao) promovido por D. Juan Perez de Tagle" and adjudicated on  May 13,  1894 to the applicant Tagle "el terreno de referenda radica en el Sitio de Bagsulan jurisdiccin de dicho pueblo y distrito dista unos veinte kilometros de la Yglesia del pueblo y fuera de la que por la principalfa se considera como legua comunal, sus lfmites son: al norte, este, sur y oeste con terrenos del Estado cuya superficie es de Ciento treinta y una hectdreas y mil treseientos metro cuadrados tasados a tres pesos cincuenta centimos la hectarea," for 458.88.
Mateo C. Sanchez, however, seeks the judicial confirmation of a title to 1,107 hectares, 91 ares and 70 centares of public land.  Why is there a difference of 976 hectares, 78 ares  and 70 centares between the area stated in the grant and that stated in the application?  In his brief, the applicant accounts for  this gross discrepancy by stating that "surveys  made during the  Spanish regime were in most cases imperfect and inaccurate, because of lack of proper means  and scientific instruments", so that, in his opinion,  the  area of 131 hectares and  13 ares  stated in Exhibit B-1  "can not be exact/'

We are not inclined  to hold that the area stated in Exhibit B-1 is erroneous.   In accordance with the Royal Decree of June 25,1880 (published in the Gazeta de Manila on September 8, 1880), said to have marked the beginning of modern Spanish land legislation in the Philippines (Vargas & Manalac, Philippine Land Registration Law, pp. 11-14), the "Decreto del Gobiemo General de 20 de agosto de 1880" was promulgated providing,  among other things, that no title could be issued without a correct survey of the land covered thereby being  first made and without  the corresponding plan thereof showing the correct boundaries and areas or, to use the very language of the decree, "con exactitud (de) la cabida y linderos." For a better under- standing of the said decree, we  shall quote its  pertinent provisions:
"Considerando que la demanda de terrenos baldios realengos y de composiciones de tierras cultivadas, aumenta diariamente en proporci0n considerable, haciendo cada vez mas imposible que los empleados de Montes puedan desempenar el servicio de medici6n y tasacion, con la brevedad conveniente.
"Considerando que es de sumo interes facilitar todo lo posible el establecimiento de la verdadera propiedad rural, este Gobierno General viene en decretar lo siguiente:
  1. ° La clasificacion de los terrenos realengos que los particulares deseen adquirir por compra o composicion, se hara siempre por los empleados facultativos de Montes, los cuales previo reconocimiento si fuere necesario, o con omisidn del  mismo si tuviese ya conocimiento detallado de la localidad en que el  terreno denunciado  radique, determinaron si por razones cosmoltfgicas, hidroldgicas o de aptitud para el cultivo agrario permanente, debe o no accederse a la enajenacidn.

  2. ° Los interesados presentardn un croqids  del terreno levantado a su  costa por un agrimensor, debiendo  hacer constar en aquil con exactitud la cabida y linderos.

  3. ° A las operaciones de  medicion asistiran el gobernadorcillo o un  teniente de justicia y dos principals, extendioidose un  acta firmada  por todos los  concurrentes en que conste la distancia del predio a la iglesia del pueblo, si el terreno esta o no baldfo en todo o en parte, si contiene o  no arbolado maderable y de que clase, quignes son los poseedores de las roturaciones en caso de haberlas, la cabida de cada una de estas y si se han presentado o no reclamaciones antes de la operacion o durante la misma,  a cuyo efecto se anunciara por bandillo, durante tres dfas consecutivos, aqu en  que las  operaciones hayan de ejecutarse, constando dicha publication en el acta.

  4. ° Los gobernadorcillos no podran negar el concurso de la comision antes indicada, a los particulares que lo soliciten quedando de lo contrario incursos en la multa que en cada caso se determine."  (Berriz, Guia del Comprador de Te rrenos, pp. 336-338.) (Underscoring ours.)
It is to be presumed that in the grant (Exhibit B-1) the requirements of the law above- quoted have been followed. (Sec. 334, pars. 14 and 31, Code of Civil Procedure.)  The area  of the land  sold to Juan Perez de  Tagle as stated should, therefore, be accepted as true.

The applicant also cites the cases of Escudero and Marasigan vs. Director of Lands ([1922], 44 Phil., 83) and Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands ([1924], 50 Phil., 879,882), as  authority for  the  proposition that the  area  given is not the principal element for the identification of land.  The applicant, indeed, could have cited many more cases holding that what really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description but  rather the boundaries therein laid down.  As stated in the case of Loyola vs. Bartolome ([1919], 39 Phil.,  544, 550):  "It is not of vital  consequence that a deed or  contract for the sale of land should declare the area  with  mathematical accuracy.  It is  sufficient if its  extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it; and where the boundaries given are adequate for this purpose, an error as to ihe superficial area is immaterial."   (See also Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Franco [1926], 49 Phil., 328,  329; Prieto vs.  Director  of Lands [1926], 50 Phil.,  971-973; Government of the Philippine Islands  vs. Abaja  [1928], 52 Phil., 261, 265.)   But a careful review of the applicable cases will show that it is only when the boundaries given are sufficiently  certain and the identity of the  land  clearly proved by the boundaries  thus indicated that an erroneous statement concerning the area can be disregarded or ignored.  Otherwise, the area stated is followed.  A few illustrative cases will be given.

In  the case of  Pamintuan  vs.  Insular Government ([1907],  8 Phil.,  512, 515), it appears that the Spanish Government made a grant of 92 hectares and  10  ares of public land  to the ancestors of the petitioner.  The petitioner, however,  claimed  in his application  626 hectares, 38 ares and 95 centiares of land.  This court said:
"While the proposition of law laid down by the court below may  be true  to the  effect that natural boundaries will  prevail  over area, yet  when the land  sought to be registered is almost  seven times as much as that described in the deed, the evidence as to natural boundaries  must be very clear and convincing before that rule can be applied. No such evidence was given in this case, and the judgment of the court below can not stand."
For a  quite similar reason, in  the  case of Paras vs. Insular Government ([1908],  11 Phil., 378), the petitioner failed in his attempt to prove his ownership of 67  hectares of land by presenting a patent from the Spanish  Government for 43 hectares, and in the case of  Carrillo vs. Insular Government ([1908],  11 Phil., 379), the petitioner failed in his attempt to prove his ownership of 107  hectares of land by presenting  a patent from the Spanish  Government for 26 hectares.

In the case of Waldroop vs. Castaneda ([1913],  25 Phil., 50, 56), it appears that the Spanish Government conveyed to Hilario Castaneda 23  hectares,  11 ares and  12 centiares of public land.  This parcel of land was later on conveyed to the petitioners. Due  to the  absence of proof  that the land which  Hilario Castaneda had obtained from the Government  had natural boundaries sufficient to clearly segregate it from the adjoining lands, it was held that  the only land to which the petitioners were  entitled  was the land which Hilario Castaneda had obtained from the  Spanish Government.  In this case, the following doctrine  was laid down by this court:
"In order that natural boundaries of land may be  accepted for the purpose of varying the extent of the land  included in a  deed of conveyance, the evidence as  to such natural boundaries  must  be clear and convincing.  Such natural boundaries must be of such  a character as to definitely and accurately segregate the land in question from the adjoining property.  There must be  no doubt  left  that  the land included within the natural boundaries is the. same land which was intended to be sold by the deed of conveyance."  (See also Sales vs. Director of Lands, 61 Phil., 759.)
As already indicated above, the boundaries of  the land purchased by Juan Perez de Tagle from the Spanish Government in 1894 were as follows:  "Al norte, este, sur y oeste con terrenos del Estado."   (Exhibit B-1.)   Nothing can be more  uncertain and indefinite!

It should be observed in this connection that the Royal Decrees in force at  the time of the acquisition  by Juan Perez de Tagle did not recognize any grant of public land in excess of  one thousand hectares.  (See Valdez vs. Di- rector of Lands,  62 Phil., 362.)

The Royal  Decree  of November 25, 1880 provides:
"Considerando que la naturaleza e importancia del asunto aconsejan adoptar algunas precauciones para evitar ciertos abusos de trascendencia, que  al  amparo de disposiciones transitoriales  pudieran cometerse, y que redundarfan en perjuicio del Tesoro publico y de  los particulares que  se dedican a cultivar y no a especular con la venta a otros, de los terrenos que se les conceden; Considerando por ultimo que deben exigirse por el  Estado ciertas garantias para aceptar las mediciones y tasaciones que practiquen los agrimensores particulares en terrenos que son de su pertinencia; S. M. el Rey (q. D. g.)  ha tenido a bien aprobar el decreto de ese Gobierno General de  28 de  agosto ultimo con las modificaciones siguientes:

" 1.° La extension  de los terrenos a los cuales se refiere dicho decreto, no podra exceder de la hectdreas para los terrenos de secano; quinientas para los de igual clase poblados de arbolado maderable, y ciento para los clasificados en el articulo 6.° del mismo decreto con la frase "que a poca costa puedan hacerse de regadfo". *"
The Royal Decree of October 26, 1881, repeats the same restriction in more vigorous terms:

"Es asimismo preciso, que para favorecer la division de la propiedad territorial y el fomento del cultivo intensivo y el de las producciones como el tabaco, lacaiia de azucar, el  cafe y otros semejantes, que se atienda con mas interes a las solicitudes en demanda de pequenas extensiones de terreno para dedicarlos a los cultivos citados, qus a las  que no se hallen en ese caso y se comprenda que no soIo no han de ponerse desde luego en  condiciones de production, sino que  Io que  busca es acaparar  los  mejores terrenos para poderse despues lucrar  con su  venta. En su consecuencia . S. M. el Key (q. D. g.) ha tenido a bien disponer lo siguiente:

" '1.° Que a fin de favorecer la division de la propiedad, en las ventas de terrenos se tenga en cuenta lo prevenido en el parrafo 1.° de la Real Orden de 25 de noviembre de 1880, para que no se verifique ninguna concesion que exceda de mil hectdreas en terrenos de secano,  de  quinientas cuando esten poblados de arbolado y de ciento cuando sean tierras que a poca costa puedan hacerse de regadio.'" It should also be observed that the amount of permissible error in the measurement of public lands was only five per cent of the total area.  (Royal Decree of January 19, 1883, article  27.)

There is still another point which weighs heavily against the claims of the applicant.  It appears that Juan  Perez de Tagle contracted with the Spanish Government for the sale of the parcel of land in question at a fixed price per unit of measure or at P3.50 per hectare, to be exact.  There can be  no  mistake as to the intention of the  parties,  no doubt as to the area conveyed by the Government to Tagle. And if Tagle bought 131 hectares and 13 ares of land paying the sum of P3.50 per hectare, it is not seen why the same land having been conveyed to the applicant, the latter should now be allowed to claim a bigger tract of land.  This would be unfair to the State.

Under the laws in force at the time the  purchase by Tagle was made, lands of the public domain were sold only by  unit of measure, that is to say, at a fixed price per hectare or per quinon, and not in the mass (cuerpos ciertos). (See Valdez  vs. Director of Lands, 62 Phil., 362.)

Articles X469 and 1470 of the Spanish  Civil Code embody a rule of construction which has been followed, according to  Manresa,  by the  Spanish Government  in  the sale  of public lands.  Article 1469, in part, provides:
"If a sale of real property should be made with a state- ment of its area, at a certain price for each unit of measure or  number, the vendor  shall be  obliged to deliver to the vendee, if the latter  should require it, all that which has been specified in the contract; but should this not  be possible, the vendee may choose between  a proportional reduction in the price or the rescission of the contract,  provided that in the latter case the deficiency be not less than one-tenth  of the stated  area  of the  property."   And article 1470 provides:

"If  in the case mentioned in the next preceding article the area of the realty should be greater  than that specified in the contract, the vendee shall be obliged to pay  the price of  the excess if the greater .area  should not exceed one-twentieth of that specified in the  contract; but should it be  more than one-twentieth, the vendee may choose between paying the greater value of the  property or withdrawing from the contract."

This court recognized and gave effect to  the  principle governing the sale of public lands in the case of Barretto vs. Director  of Lands (G. R. No. 29717, promulgated December 29,  1928, not  reported).  In this case,  the title conveying a  tract of public land in  the Province  of Zambales to Antonio Lorenzo Barretto was described by natural boundaries as follows: "Baldios y  realengos unos  terrenos situados  en  la Provincia de  Zambales,  jurisdiccidn del Pueblo de Cabungan, Sitio de Balintagac, Iindando al sur, con el Monte de Carmen; al norte, el Rio Anonang; al este, el rincon de Balintagac y al oeste el Monte de Tictic."   The area was stated to be 200 quinones  and for each quindn four reales were paid.
This court said:
"Dado que, excepto el  Rio Anonang4al lado norte, los demas linderos consignados  en este  titulo  no son puntos o Ifneas  especfficas por no constar claramente ni en tal documento ni en  las pruebas  aportadas donde empiezan determinadamente el monte del Carmen, el rinc6n de Balin- tagac o el Monte de Tictic, y teniendo en cuenta que la venta efectuada por el Gobierno espanol a  favor  de D.  Antonio Lorenzo  Barretto causante del  aqul  solicitante, no fue  a cuerpo cierto toda vez que los linderos son inciertos  sino de 200 quinones a razon  de cuatro reales cada quin6n, es decir, a un tanto por unidad de medida, entendemos acertada la  alegacion  de los abogados del apelante de que la verdadera intencion del Estado como vendedor y del refe- rido D. Antonio Lorenzo Barretto como  comprador  fue transfefir a este 200 quinones de terreno en aquel Sitio de Balintagac extendiendose desde el Rio Anonang hacia el sur, este u oeste.  Y tal intencion  del Estado  de celebrar la venta, no a cuerpo cierto, sino a un tanto  por unidad de medida y que, antes del 7 de abril de 1869 todavia daba lugar a incertidumbres en casos dudosos, quedo desde dicha fecha definitivamente reconocida por el orden del Poder Ejecutivo, a la cual se  refiere Manresa en el parrafo que trascribimos a continuation:

" 'Desde esta fecha de 7 de abril de 1869 es, por lo tanto, indudable que las ventas de bienes del Estado no se hacen a cuerpo cierto, sino a razon de  un tanto  por unidad de medida o numero.  Por otra parte, las sentencias  del  Tribunal Supremo de  5 de mayo  de 1870  y de 11 de febrero de 1877, y el Real Decreto sentencia de 20 de marzo de 1885, coinciden en afirmar que la doctrina de los cuerpos ciertos no pueden tener aplicaci6n a las ventas del bienes del Estado, sea cual fuere su fecha/  (10 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol,  pag.  164, Edici6n de 1908.)"

The same principle has been embodied in several decrees. In the Royal Decree of November 27,1880, published in the Gaceta de Manila, No. 65, of March 6, 1881, it was said, among other things:
"Acreditado por los mismos titulos que presenta Ramirez, que lo que verdaderamente adquirid del Estado o mejor bus causantes D. Mariano Albea y D. Felix Guianzo, se reduce sdlo a 2438 hectareas, poco mas o menos, es evidente que la pretensidn de que se le reconozca  como legltimo poseedor de 16,000, a pretexto de lo que adjudicado ha de entenderse como cuerpo  cierto,  si se apoya en disposicion aJguna positiva, ni en doctrina, ni principios atendibles bajo ningun  concepto, pues la teoria de cuerpos ciertos, desechada ya en la Peninsula absolutamente,  segun se  declara en varias disposidones del Gobierno,  no  ha regido nunca en Filipinos, ni  aun cuando hubiera estado en vigor, seria aplicable a este caso dados los terminos en que se hicieron las respectivas adjudicaciones.  Otro  tanto puede  decirse de las demas pretensiones formuladas por  el recurrente Ramirez, invocando  los principios de equidad porque esta no puede ser decisiva cuando se perjudican los intereses de una de  las partes; y es  notorio que aquf se perjudicarfan notablemente los del Estado, tolerando una usurpacion tan considerable o recibiendo como precio muchisimo menos del que realmente tienen los  terrenos que al mismo Estado per- tenecen."
In  paragraph 5 of the "Decreto del Gobierno General de 20 de agosto de 1880", hereinbefore referred to, the principle  regarding  the collusiveness of area was  plainly recognized:
"En cualquiera opoca en que  se descubra error o ocultacion en la medida del terreno, que exceda de  un'quinto de la cabida total, y en caso de  que se averigfie que no ha sido consignada en el acta la reclamacid"n  hecha por alguna persona, o que los lfmites no se han expresado con exac- titud, se anulara la adjudicacidn y el Estado reivindicarii la propiedad del terreno, cualesquiera que sean las condi- ciones en que se halle, sin indemnizacion  alguna por las mejoras que el poseedor hubiere hecho, ni  reintegro de lo satisfecho."  Of  the  same  tenor is paragraph 3  of the Royal Decree of June 22. 1882:
"Si entablase reclamaci6n sobre exceso o falta de cabida del terreno subastado y del expediente resiritase que dicha falta  o exceso iguala a la quinta parte de  la  expresada en  el anuncio, sera  nula la  venta;  quedando  en el  caso contrario, firme y subsistente y sin derecho a indemnizaci6n la Hacienda  ni el comprador."  Article 27, Royal  Decree of January 19, 1883,  provided:
"El error tolerable  en las mediciones de baldfos realengos sera el de cinco por ciento de la cabida total.  Cuando  exceda de dicha cantidad y no pase del quince por ciento, el mismo poseedor del terreno  tendra derecho a la composicion de la parte sobrante por el precio de  la tasaci6n que corresponda  considerado  como  baldio;  pero  si el exceso fuese mayor de quince por ciento se sacara a subasta con obli- gaci6n por parte del  rematante de indemnizar al poseeder el importe de las mejoras se hara por un perito nombrado por cada parte y por un tercero nombrado por la Admi- nistraci6n en caso de  discordia.   Cuando el error de la medicion exceda del quince por ciento, se instruira expediente para  exigir  a los  peritos la responsabilidad que  corresponda."
In three recent cases involving also lands situated in the Province of Masbate, this  court appHed the foregoing principle governing the sale of lands of the public domain and denied  the application  for registration of  lands  in excess of those stated in the titles concerned.  These are the cases of Rosado vs. Director of Lands (58 Phil, 833); Martinez vs. Director of Lands (G. R. No. 37303, promul- gated January 19,  1934  [59 Phil., 958]);  and  Valdez vs. Director of Lands (62 Phil., 362).

In the first of these cases, the title described the land as follows:  "Al norte y oeste, terrenos del  Estado; al  este, playa, y al sur, bosque y terrenos del Estado."   The  area was stated to be 144  hectares, 89 ares and 76 centiares. The applicant, however, sought the registration in his favor of 966 hectares, 30 ares and 95 centiares of public pasture land.  In rejecting the application, this court said:
"It is doubtless true that when a deed describes a tract of  land by definite and ascertainable  boundaries, an additional statement as to the area included  is of secondary importance, because it is presumed that the parties  to the deed contracted with reference to the land specifically  delimited in the description.  But this rule, has no application in the present case for two reasons:  First, because the land is not specifically delimited by definite and ascertainable boundaries; and, second, because the record shows, as above set out, that the Spanish  Government and  Alejandro  Da- nao contracted with reference  to a  definite area, because the minimum acceptable bid was  based on  the area of 144 hectares, 89 ares and 70  centares."
In the second case, the title described the land as bounded on the  north by the Boracay River and public land;  on the east by the sea; on the south, by the Bangad  River  and public land; and on the west, by public  cogon land.  The area was stated to be  80 hectares, 71 ares and 30 centiares but the applicant sought the registration of 866 hectares, 54 ares and 17 centiares of land. After quoting the  rule laid down in the case of Rosado vs. Director of Lands, supra, this court said:
"In the case before us the price of the  grant was estimated  on the basis  of two pesos per hectare and the price paid for 80 hectares, 71 ares and 30 centares amounted to only about P161.  This does not show a right to the 866 hectares and a fraction claimed by the appellant."
In the third and last case,  the total  area sold  by the Spanish Government and purchased  by the grantees in 19 titles was 2,225.9194 hectares of land.  The lands were sold to  the  grantees at  a  fixed price  per hectare.  In  denying the application  for 28,006.5959  hectares  of public land, this  court referred to the two  cases above discussed and said:
"Under the Royal Decree of October 28, 1869,  the decisions of the Intendencia General de Hacienda adjudicating titles to public lands  were required to be published in the Gaceta de Manila of  which we  take judicial notice.   (Di- rector of Lands vs. Absolo, 46 Phil., 282, 307.)  From these decisions as well as from the recitals in the nineteen titulos themselves,  which are the origin of the claimants' title in the case before us, it appears  that each  of the  nineteen tracts was sold to the  purchaser at a fixed price per hectare, that is to say, both the government and the purchaser contracted specifically with reference to the area stated in the titulos.   For each title the government was paid by the hectare for  the  number of hectares indicated in the title and  no more.  Any  area granted to these applicants  in excess of the  percentage of permissible error would be a pure gift without consideration  whatever to the State."
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the applicant, Mateo C. Sanchez, is entitled to the registration only of 131 hectares and 13  ares of the land claimed by him and to the issuance to  him of a  certificate  of  title covering this area. Judgment is accordingly modified and  upon the submission of an amended and approved  plan  in conformity with this decision, the lower court will order the issuance of the corresponding  decree of  registration and confirmation of title. No costs will be  charged in this  instance.   So ordered.

Avanceña,C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

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