This case has been cited 5 times or more.
2011-08-24 |
PEREZ, J. |
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Thus, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517,[68] as amended by P.D. No. 2016,[69] grants to qualified tenants of land in areas declared as urban land reform zones, the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at a reasonable price.[70] The same right is accorded by Republic Act No. 7279[71] (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) to qualified beneficiaries of socialized housing, with respect to the land they are occupying. Accordingly, in Valderama v. Macalde,[72] Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[73] and Conculada v. Court of Appeals,[74] the Supreme Court sustained the tenant's right of first refusal pursuant to P.D. 1517. | |||||
2010-10-18 |
BRION, J. |
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In her answer to the complaint, Matias alleged that she and her family have been living on the subject property since the 1950s on the basis of a written permit issued by the local government of Malabon in 1954.[7] Matias stated that she and her family have introduced substantial improvements on the subject property and have been regularly paying realty taxes thereon. She further claimed that she is a legitimate beneficiary of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1517[8] and PD No. 2016,[9] which classified the subject property as part of the Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ) and an Area for Priority Development (APD). | |||||
2009-05-08 |
BRION, J. |
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It appears undisputed that the petitioner possesses requisites 2 and 3 - he built his home on the leased property and has lived there for more than 10 years. The inclusion of the land in the APD and the ULRZ was not raised as an issue before the appellate court.[11] The bone of contention that the lower courts emphasized is whether he is a legitimate tenant as defined by the Act, as amended by P.D. No. 2016. A legitimate tenant is one who is not a usurper or an occupant by tolerance.[12] Sections 3(f) of the Act, as amended by P.D. No. 2016, provides:SEC. 3(f). Tenant refers to the rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation. The lower courts unanimously held that the petitioner was not a legitimate tenant, as he had failed to pay his rentals for the months of May to August, 1994. We find this conclusion questionable, as mere failure to pay rent does not make the lessee's possession of the premises unlawful, thereby denying him the status of being a tenant. What should assume materiality here is that the petitioner is not a usurper or an occupant by tolerance, but one who believed that he had a claim to possession based on the right of first refusal. If at all, the more appropriate reason would have been the pendency of an ejectment case against the petitioner at the time he filed his complaint for annulment of sale. Even this reason, however, is not a clear cut reason for barring him from filing his annulment of sale case; his status as a tenant involves factual and legal questions touching on, and intertwined with, the merits of the annulment of sale case. In other words, it is a legitimate issue that could have been raised in the case and cannot be an outright bar to the filing of the case. We find it obvious that, at that point, the petitioner resorted to the complaint for annulment of sale as a counter-step, taken at another venue and for another legal reason bearing on, but not directly related to, the issues in the ejectment case he was facing. | |||||
2008-08-22 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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More in point is Dulay v. Tabago,[62] in which the Court sustained the RTC in suspending the eviction of Spouses Tabago from the property of Spouses Dulay in view of the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 2016, which placed the disputed property under the coverage of P.D. No. 1517 and prohibited the eviction of the tenants therein. As there was no dispute over the status of Spouses Tabago as tenants on the property since 1959, or over the status of the property as an urban land reform area, the Court therein held:Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 2016, which was promulgated to forestall violations of P.D. No. 1517, provides that "No tenant or occupant family, residing for ten years or more, reckoned from the date of issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1517 [June 11, 1978] otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform Law, in land proclaimed as Areas of Priority Development . . . shall be evicted from the land or otherwise dispossessed" (emphasis added). Considering that respondents have been occupants of the lot in question since 1959 and in view of the subsequent classification of the said land as an APD, petitioners' action for ejectment cannot prosper. | |||||
2005-06-21 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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Petitioners appealed to the Office of the President.[10] Invoking Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517,[11] as amended by P.D. No. 2016,[12] they contended that since the Tramo-Singalong ZIP Project was proclaimed as an Area for Priority Development and Land Reform Zone, they have the right of first refusal to purchase the property and should not be dispossessed of the subject lot, being legitimate tenants thereof who have built their home and resided thereon for 44 years, way beyond the 10 year occupancy requirement mandated by law.[13] |