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DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS v. COMELEC

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 195540 2013-03-13	GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.[23] Equal protection permits of reasonable classification.[24] We have ruled that one class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions.[25] If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.[26]
	GR No. 183591 2008-10-14	PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN CARPIO MORALES, J.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain[7] and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
	GR No. 183591 2008-10-14	PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN CARPIO MORALES, J.
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as `Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.[30]
	GR No. 163583 2008-08-20	BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO v. JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that the classification freeze provision violates the GATT, the outcome would still be the same. The GATT is a treaty duly ratified by the Philippine Senate and under Article VII, Section 21[81] of the Constitution, it merely acquired the status of a statute.[82] Applying the basic principles of statutory construction in case of irreconcilable conflict between statutes, RA 8240, as amended by RA 9334, would prevail over the GATT either as a later enactment by Congress or as a special law dealing with the taxation of sin products. Thus, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,[83] we had occasion to explain:Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement. The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.
	GR No. 149848 2004-11-25	ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS TINGA, J,
E.O. 426 was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6734 the validity of which this Court upheld in the case of Abbas v. Commission on Elections.[83] In Section 4, Article XVIII of said Act, "central government or national government offices and agencies in the autonomous region which are not excluded under Section 3, Article IV[84] of this Organic Act, shall be placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the oversight committee."
	GR No. 146319 2001-10-26	BENJAMIN E. CAWALING v. COMELEC SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.[6] This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.[7] The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law.[8] This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.[9] In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt,[10] for to doubt is to sustain.[11]