This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2007-10-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner GSIS reiterates the explanation of retinal detachment in Dr. Fajardo's book as quoted by the Court of Appeals: Retinal Detachment or retinal separation may either be primary (idiopathic) or secondary. In the primary type, for which the cause is not known, there is actually separation of the inner sensory layer of the retina from the outer pigmentary layer. Primary retinal detachment is always associated with a break in the retina either as a tear or a hole. Vitreous fluid seeps in through the retinal break and initiates the separation and detachment of the retina. The secondary type of retinal detachment is due to some disease process of the retina or its neighboring structures the vitreous and choroids. This could be due to a history of trauma, prior cataract extraction, inflammatory process or exudes (choroiditis, Harada's disease), tumor cells or traction on the retina.[13] Petitioner GSIS argues that since the cause is not known for the first type of retinal detachment, the ailment must be conclusively presumed as not work-connected, pursuant to the Decisions of this Court in Sante v. ECC,[14] and Raro v. ECC,[15] where we held: The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed. On the other hand, the second type of retinal detachment could be caused by prior cataract extraction, inflammatory process or exudates, tumor cells or traction on the retina, or trauma. Petitioner GSIS argues that among these causes, only trauma can be attributable to one's work, and that no proof was adduced by respondent Ibarra that any injury in his right eye was suffered while he was at work. | |||||
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2005-12-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Unfortunately, such bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that there is indeed a causal relationship between the illness of the deceased and his working conditions. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions.[13] The claimant must prove a positive proposition.[14] As ruled in Sante v. Employees' Compensation Commission: [15] | |||||