This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2006-07-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Assuming for the sake of argument that respondent had indeed violated Section 94(b) of the Manual, her dismissal from employment is still invalid. Section 94(b) uses the word "may" and not "shall.- In this jurisdiction, the tendency has been to interpret the word "shall" or "may" as the context or a reasonable construction of the statute in which they are used demands or requires. As a general rule, the word "may" when used in statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.[35] In the case at bar, the use of the word "may" under Section 94(b) thereof implies that petitioners are permitted and authorized to terminate the employment of respondent for tampering or falsification of school records. However, such authority is not absolute. It does not give petitioners the unlimited power to automatically terminate the employment of respondent. Such authority is merely permissive and discretionary. Such prerogative cannot be permitted by this Court if exercised arbitrarily and unfairly to defeat the constitutional protection to labor. Moreover, as heretofore pointed out, there are circumstances present in this case which mitigate the misconduct of respondent. It would be different if the word "shall" is used or the same is phrased in a negative manner. In such a case, the dismissal of respondent is mandatory and automatic.[36] We find no exception to deviate from this general rule of statutory construction. | |||||