This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2004-03-10 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| SO ORDERED.[3] The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 31820. On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court. The decretal portion of the decision reads, thus: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and a new one entered as follows: (1) Declaring that Gregorio Lumapas has not sufficiently proved that he is the son of Guillermo Lumapas; and | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
PER CURIAM |
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| SO ORDERED.[3] Complainant averred that following this Court's denial on September 13, 2000[4] of the respondent's motion for reconsideration,[5] he filed with the trial court on September 19, 2000 another motion for execution[6] of the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820. As previously mentioned, the respondent denied the motion by Order[7] dated September 22, 2000. | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
PER CURIAM |
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| When this Court acts on complaints against judges or any personnel under its supervision, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies.[16] In this case the issue is whether the respondent should be held administratively liable for his continued refusal to perform a ministerial duty and to obey the lawful order of a superior court, not whether the complainant is entitled to the land in question or to its possession the issues in CV No. 31820. Hence, what is involved is not this Court's power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in cases involving only questions of law. The present administrative case does not call for the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
PER CURIAM |
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| What we are saying is that, although appellee has not sufficiently proved his filiation to the late Guillermo Lumapas, the fact that he has a legal title over the subject land entitles him to the possession thereof, pending the final determination of the validity of the title issued to him in an appropriate proceeding.[19] In Edwards v. Arce,[20] this Court has clarified that the dispositive portion is the only portion of a judgment which becomes the subject of execution. Here, the dispositive portion of the CA decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820 is unequivocal and requires no interpretation as regards the absolute and unconditional nature of the complainant's right of Possession over the subject lot. The dispositive portion reads as follows: | |||||
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2000-07-14 |
PUNO, J. |
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| On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we are convinced that appellant is guilty of rape as found by the trial court. However, aside from the imposable penalty, the award of damages should also be modified. The trial court ordered appellant to pay the complainant P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. In accordance with current jurisprudence,[25] moral damages are now automatically awarded to victims of incestuous rape without need of proof, in the amount of P50,000.00. | |||||
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2000-07-05 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| Republic Act 7659 introduced seven modes of committing rape,[38] including the twin special qualifying circumstances of the victim's age and the relationship between the victim and the culprit, which would warrant the automatic imposition of the death penalty. The seven modes of committing rape partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since their presence increases the penalty of rape to one (1) degree.[39] The long-standing rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment, if the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances.[40] For rape to be qualified as heinous, warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in the information for rape.[41] | |||||
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2000-07-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| With respect to the monetary awards, the P50,000.00 "damages" granted by the trial court should be properly denominated as moral damages, which is allowed even if there was no proof during the trial as basis therefor.[22] The mental and physical suffering of the victims' injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime which per se warrants the award of moral damages.[23] In addition thereto, the complainant is also entitled to a civil indemnity of P50,000.00[24] which is outrightly awarded to rape victims being in the category of actual or compensatory damages[25] and because the rape herein is not effectively qualified by any circumstance under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law.[26] | |||||