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CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN v. TEODORICO T. MARAYAG

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 176413 2009-11-25	SPS. DANILO T. SAMONTE AND ROSALINDA N. SAMONTE v. CENTURY SAVINGS BANK
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue.[18] The Court has, in fact, affirmed this rule in the following precedents: Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966]) do not abate the latter; and neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue, et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]).
	GR No. 150025 2008-07-23	SPS. NARCISO BARNACHEA AND JULITA BARNACHEA v. CA BRION, J.
The CA denied the petition and the petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration, essentially on the grounds that (1) the issue in an ejectment suit is limited to the physical possession of real property and is separate and distinct from the issue of ownership and possession de jure that either party may set forth in his or her pleading; (2) the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of deed of sale does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, and that ejectment actions generally cannot be suspended pending the resolution of a case for quieting of title between the same parties over the same subject property; and (3) the case does not fall under the exception provided by the case of Amagan v. Marayag[4], where the Court allowed the suspension of ejectment proceedings because of strong reasons of equity applicable to the case - the demolition of the petitioner's house unless the proceedings would be suspended. The CA ruled that the petitioners' reliance on Amagan was inappropriate because the said case only applies to unlawful detainer actions while the petitioners' ejectment suit is an action for forcible entry. To the CA, the initial tolerance on the part of the private respondents did not convert the nature of their ejectment suit from forcible entry into unlawful detainer, following the reasoning this Court applied in Munoz v. Court of Appeals.[5]
	GR No. 174042 2008-07-09	CITY OF NAGA v. ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION QUISUMBING, J.
...Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.[50] Needless to reiterate, grave and irreparable injury will be inflicted on the City of Naga by the immediate execution of the June 20, 2005 RTC Decision. Foremost, as pointed out by petitioner, the people of Naga would be deprived of access to basic social services. It should not be forgotten that the land subject of the ejectment case houses government offices which perform important functions vital to the orderly operation of the local government. As regards the garnishment of Naga City's account with the Land Bank, the rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds. Hence, they may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of corresponding appropriation as required by law.[51] For this reason, we hold that the Notice of Garnishment dated August 23, 2006 is void.
	GR NO. 157604 2005-10-19	GEORGE V. BENEDICTO v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
In the case of Amagan v. Marayag,[13] we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño[14] that the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew a fine line between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus:Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.[15]
	GR NO. 152978 2005-03-04	ANICIA U. TECSON v. DANTE GUTIERREZ QUISUMBING, J.
Although respondent impugned the validity of petitioners' title over the property and claimed it to be his homelot, this assertion could not divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment cases.[14] The court could not be divested of jurisdiction over the ejectment cases on the mere allegation that the defendant asserts ownership over the litigated property.[15] Moreover, a pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings.[16] The ejectment cases can proceed independently of the DARAB case. The underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.[17]
	GR No. 150633 2003-11-12	HEIRS OF DEMETRIO MELCHOR v. JULIO MELCHOR PANGANIBAN, J.
It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. These actions, which deal with physical or de facto possession,[19] may be distinguished as follows:"(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable."[20]
	GR No. 151212 2003-09-10	TEN FORTY REALTY v. MARINA CRUZ PANGANIBAN, J.
While both causes of action deal only with the sole issue of physical or de facto possession,[18] the two cases are really separate and distinct, as explained below:"x x x. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.