This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-08-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the first strike or the mechanics' refusal to work on 3 consecutive holidays was prompted by their disagreement with the management-imposed new work schedule. Having been grounded on a non-strikeable issue and without complying with the procedural requirements, then the same is a violation of the "No Strike-No Lockout Policy" in the existing CBA. Respecting the second strike, where the Union complied with procedural requirements, the same was not a violation of the "No Strike- No Lockout" provisions, as a "No Strike-No Lockout" provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a valid stipulation but may be invoked only by employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice.[10] In the present case, the Union believed in good faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when it went on strike on account of the 30-day suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer and perceived union-busting, among others. As held in Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggaggawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos:[11] | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Nonetheless, while We uphold dismissal pursuant to a union security clause, the same is not without a condition or restriction. For to allow its untrammeled enforcement would encourage arbitrary dismissal and abuse by the employer, to the detriment of the employees. Thus, to safeguard the rights of the employees, We have said time and again that dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal, subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal.[46] In like manner, We emphasized that the enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law, provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process.[47] | |||||
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2008-02-14 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| (b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. The CA also said the dismissal of the three respondents was contrary to the doctrine laid down in Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos (Malayang Samahan), where this Court ruled that even on the assumption that the union had valid grounds to expel the local union officers, due process requires that the union officers be accorded a separate hearing by the employer company.[15] | |||||
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2007-11-23 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to exist, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts.[15] Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to go back to his work post and resume his employment must be established. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.[16] And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.[17] | |||||
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2007-03-02 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Accordingly, DAR Regional Director Nestor Acosta (Director Acosta) issued a Memorandum[8] dated May 9, 2000, directing herein public respondent Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Teofilo Inocencio (PARO Inocencio) to implement the Garilao Order. In turn, PARO Inocencio instructed Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Lino Mabborang (MARO Mabborang) to issue the necessary documents to award Lot No. 90 to Dela Cruz, et al..[9] | |||||
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2006-08-15 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The general rule is that, factual findings of the NLRC, particularly where the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.[25] Such factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding when supported by substantial evidence, meaning, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[26] Thus, the Supreme Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC as when it finds insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support those factual findings. The same holds true when it is perceived that far too much is concluded, inferred, or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing of record.[27] | |||||
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2003-10-08 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to exist, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to go back to his work post and resume his employment must be established. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.[10] | |||||
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2002-01-31 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Such dictum has been punctiliously followed since then.[17] | |||||