This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2006-09-27 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| The trial court correctly cancelled respondent's bail because of his failure to appear during the promulgation of judgment despite notice. He violated the condition of his bail that he must appear before the proper court whenever so required by that court or the Rules.[2] Simply stated, he jumped bail. As such, his arrest, as ordered by the trial court, is proper.[3] This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides in part, thus:SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. x x x | |||||
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2001-06-06 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal in non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled.[18] In the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact convicted by the trial court.[19] In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco's disquisition on why bail should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion; thus: The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. xxx [20] | |||||