This case has been cited 20 times or more.
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2014-11-12 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| To determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the crime as defined by law, is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function.[22] The public prosecutor, who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the crime as defined by law and, thus, should be held for trial, has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.[23] Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, that is, whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.[24] Thus, in the oft-cited case of Crespo v. Mogul, it was stated that: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons. | |||||
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2013-02-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| This broad authority of prosecutors, however, is circumscribed by the requirement of a conscientious conduct of a preliminary investigation for offenses where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day.[113] This rule is intended to guarantee the right of every person to be free from "the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon"[114] and to guard the State against the "burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges."[115] | |||||
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2010-11-24 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[35] we clarified that the justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over the investigating prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court. However, the justice secretary's subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the court is duty-bound to exercise judicial discretion and its own independent judgment in assessing the merits of the resulting motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution, to wit: When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounded duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action. (Underscoring supplied.) | |||||
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2010-08-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense best left to the trial court's deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is "not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof."[47] A "finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged."[48] So we held in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals:[49] | |||||
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2010-08-03 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| This is also true with respect to a motion for reconsideration before the Secretary of Justice. Review, whether on appeal or on motion for reconsideration, as an act of supervision and control by the Secretary of Justice over the prosecutors, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency may be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.[43] In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw the information, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses the finding of probable cause, is subject to the discretion of the court.[44] | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| and our complementary holding in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[7] thus: x x x [A] court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. | |||||
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2009-09-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Court added: x x x [A] court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioner has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, [34] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [35] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[36] Dimatulac v. Villon,[37] and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[38] | |||||
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2009-03-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| "In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the court's bare denial of a motion to withdraw information pursuant to the Secretary's resolution is void." (Underscoring ours). 6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of the OSG because of its falsity.[16] This statement of petitioners' counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decision in Ledesma.[17] The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides: No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the | |||||
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2009-02-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Considering that the trial court has the power and duty to look into the propriety of the prosecution's motion to dismiss, with much more reason is it for the trial court to evaluate and to make its own appreciation and conclusion, whether the modification of the charges and the dropping of one of the accused in the information, as recommended by the Justice Secretary, is substantiated by evidence. This should be the state of affairs, since the disposition of the case -- such as its continuation or dismissal or exclusion of an accused -- is reposed in the sound discretion of the trial court.[14] | |||||
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2008-03-14 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In Crespo, the Court laid down the rule that once an Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court. In subsequent cases,[20] the Court clarified that Crespo does not bar the Justice Secretary from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as practicable, to refrain from entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor's finding when the Information is already filed in court. In other words, the power or authority of the Justice Secretary to review the prosecutor's findings subsists even after the Information is filed in court. The court, however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.[21] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner Gonzalez's allegation that Best Price PX, Inc. is the real party in the trust receipt transaction and his assertion that the real transaction between respondent HSBC and MLRC is a loan agreement, are matters of defense best left to the trial court's deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To reiterate, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.[47] | |||||
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2007-07-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We do not herein abandon the ruling that the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion when confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice.[58] Surely, trial courts are called to validly and properly exercise judicial discretion and independence. But where the accused has already been arraigned without reservation, condition or restriction, in line with our ruling in Adasa v. Abalos,[59] the unconditional arraignment constitutes a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Consequently, there is a waiver or abandonment of his petition for review before the Department of Justice. In like manner, therefore, the trial court has no more need to make an independent assessment of the evidence before it to determine probable cause. Trial ensues. Conversely, with the arraignment of the accused, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because the accused has already waived or abandoned the same. | |||||
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2007-02-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its being outrightly dismissible, such as when the accused has already been arraigned, or where the crime the accused is being charged with has already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has been committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result would not only be incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would also render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.[13] In her steadfast effort to champion her case, petitioner contends that the issue as to whether the DOJ rightfully entertained the instant case, despite the arraignment of the accused prior to its filing, has been rendered moot and academic with the order of dismissal by the trial court dated 27 February 2003. Such contention deserves scant consideration. | |||||
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2006-07-14 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| The determination of a probable cause during a preliminary investigation pertains to the public prosecutor who inquires into facts concerning the commission of a crime with the end in view of determining whether an information may be prepared and filed against the accused.[22] This prefatory inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is well-founded ground to believe that a crime has been committed by the accused who is probably guilty thereof,[23] and ergo should be held for trial.[24] Such investigation should be distinguished from an inquiry to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind, also called preliminary investigation proper, is executive in nature and is part of the prosecutor's job. The second kind is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.[25] | |||||
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2006-03-24 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written.[9] Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person.[10] Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public. | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.[33] | |||||
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2003-08-15 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "Since it is the accused who wishes to travel even while his case is pending review, and in order that the Court might not lose jurisdiction over him while he is abroad, the accused and counsel are advised as part of the arraignment process, that the arraignment is `conditional', i.e., that arraignment is without prejudice to the results of the reinvestigation or review; that if the prosecution should recommend the filing of new charges, in lieu of the present charge, which would necessarily include or be included in the present accusation, the accused would now be understood as having waived his right against double jeopardy; and that if the prosecution sought to withdraw the information, the arraignment would be deemed to have been of no effect. If the accused accepts these conditions for arraignment, then he is arraigned and allowed to travel. In other words, in this instance, the accused is clearly aware of what is going on; at the time of his arraignment, there is an explicit waiver against the protection against double jeopardy as a condition for his travel."[20] (Italics supplied) Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 60 days when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either the Department of Justice or the Office of the President. However, we should stress that the court does not lose control of the proceedings by reason of such review. Once it had assumed jurisdiction, it is not handcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing prosecuting authority.[21] Neither is it deprived of its jurisdiction by such resolution.[22] The principles established in Crespo v. Mogul[23] still stands, as follows:Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. | |||||