Lawyerly

GR No. 170139

2014-08-05

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY v. JOY C. CABILES

LEONEN, J.

Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced."[97] It is a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."[98]

GR No. 198554

2012-07-30

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PERALTA, J.

Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[37] It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.[38] The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.[39] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[40] It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.[41] "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."[42] In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.[43] It must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.

GR No. 176951

2011-02-15

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.[9]

GR No. 189698

2009-12-01

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMELEC

NACHURA, J.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[103] It does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction.[104] What the clause simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.[105] By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.[106]

GR No. 176951

2008-11-18

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

It is not the province of the Court to delve into the wisdom of legislative enactments. The only function of courts is the interpretation of laws. The principle of separation of powers prevents them from reinventing laws.[140] By the very nature of the function of the Legislature, it is that branch of government that is vested with being the judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law.[141] Courts are bereft of any power to take away the prerogatives of the legislature in the guise of construing or interpreting the law.[142] In making choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes, are not addressed to the judiciary. They may be addressed only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive, to which courts have no business of prying into. Whichever way the legislative and executive branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and their constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not the courts of justice.[143]

GR No. 168056

2005-09-01

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX LAW

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of capital goods or the 5% final withholding tax by the government. It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class.[87]

GR NO. 145742

2005-08-14

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. CIPRES STEVEDORING

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As "police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep,"[48] whatever proprietary right that respondent may have acquired must necessarily give way to a valid exercise of police power, thus:[49]

GR No. 145742

2005-07-14

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. CIPRES STEVEDORING

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As "police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep,"[48] whatever proprietary right that respondent may have acquired must necessarily give way to a valid exercise of police power, thus:[49]

GR No. 148208

2004-12-15

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS

PUNO, J.

Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.[15] The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.[16] If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.[17] The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.[18]

AM No. 03-10-05-SC

2004-10-01

RE:

TINGA, J,

The equal protection clause does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.[18] This Court fails to see any reasonable basis for the exclusion of the subject positions from the coverage of R.A. No. 9227.

GR No. 147387

2003-12-10

RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.[42] In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.

GR Nos. 132875-76

2000-02-03

PEOPLE v. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

	GR No. 170139 2014-08-05	SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY v. JOY C. CABILES LEONEN, J.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced."[97] It is a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."[98]
	GR No. 198554 2012-07-30	MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PERALTA, J.
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[37] It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.[38] The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.[39] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[40] It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.[41] "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."[42] In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.[43] It must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.
	GR No. 176951 2011-02-15	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.[9]
	GR No. 189698 2009-12-01	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[103] It does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction.[104] What the clause simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.[105] By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.[106]
	GR No. 176951 2008-11-18	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
It is not the province of the Court to delve into the wisdom of legislative enactments. The only function of courts is the interpretation of laws. The principle of separation of powers prevents them from reinventing laws.[140] By the very nature of the function of the Legislature, it is that branch of government that is vested with being the judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law.[141] Courts are bereft of any power to take away the prerogatives of the legislature in the guise of construing or interpreting the law.[142] In making choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes, are not addressed to the judiciary. They may be addressed only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive, to which courts have no business of prying into. Whichever way the legislative and executive branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and their constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not the courts of justice.[143]
	GR No. 168056 2005-09-01	CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX LAW AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of capital goods or the 5% final withholding tax by the government. It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class.[87]
	GR NO. 145742 2005-08-14	PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. CIPRES STEVEDORING CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As "police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep,"[48] whatever proprietary right that respondent may have acquired must necessarily give way to a valid exercise of police power, thus:[49]
	GR No. 145742 2005-07-14	PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. CIPRES STEVEDORING CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As "police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep,"[48] whatever proprietary right that respondent may have acquired must necessarily give way to a valid exercise of police power, thus:[49]
	GR No. 148208 2004-12-15	CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS PUNO, J.
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.[15] The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.[16] If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.[17] The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.[18]
	AM No. 03-10-05-SC 2004-10-01	RE: TINGA, J,
The equal protection clause does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.[18] This Court fails to see any reasonable basis for the exclusion of the subject positions from the coverage of R.A. No. 9227.
	GR No. 147387 2003-12-10	RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CALLEJO, SR., J.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.[42] In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
	GR Nos. 132875-76 2000-02-03	PEOPLE v. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

LAO H. ICHONG v. JAIME HERNANDEZ