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PEOPLE v. JOHN MAMARION

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 175195 2010-09-15	VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN v. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES DEL CASTILLO, J.
The testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless such testimony is supported by other evidence. As an exception, however, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.[1]
	GR No. 188601 2010-06-29	PEOPLE v. JO HNNY BAUTISTA Y BAUTISTA VELASCO JR., J.
Physical impossibility takes into consideration not only the geographical distance between the scene of the crime and the place where the accused-appellant maintains where he was at, but more importantly, the accessibility between these two points - how this distance translates to number of hours of travel.[56] Geographical distances may be taken judicial notice of, but this alone will not suffice for purposes of proving an alibi.[57]
	GR Nos. 163972-77 2008-03-28	JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
MEASURES). [9] People of the Philippines v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 75 (2003).
	GR NO. 169962 2007-07-12	PEOPLE v. RAUL CENAHONON NACHURA, J.
In this case, both Magaway and Alamag proved to be credible witnesses as there was nothing to show that they were actuated by any ill motive to testify against Cenahonon and Erdaje. Hence, the presumption that these witnesses were not moved by improper motive or bias, and thus, entitled to full faith and credit, holds.[39]
	GR NO. 159950 2007-02-12	JOEL P. GONZALES v. PEOPLE QUISUMBING, J.
The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is covered by Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613.[9] In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.[10] When these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate,[11] sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject.[12]
	GR NO. 163217 2006-04-18	CELESTINO MARTURILLAS v. PEOPLE PANGANIBAN, CJ
Fourth. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. Instead, he avers that when he went to the situs of the crime, the wife of the victim was already shouting and accusing him of being the assailant, so he just left. This reaction was very unlikely of an innocent barangay captain, who would simply want to investigate a crime. Often have we ruled that the first impulse of innocent persons when accused of wrongdoing is to express their innocence at the first opportune time.[55]
	GR NO. 166479 2006-02-28	RODOLFO C. VELASCO v. PEOPLE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petitioner argues that he could not have been the assailant because it was simply impossible for him, being a navy man, not to fatally hit private complainant after firing seven shots at close range. In effect, what he is saying is that the bungled killing cannot be the handiwork of an experienced soldier like him. Such an argument does not hold water. In the case of People v. Mamarion,[47] we brushed aside the very same argument raised by the accused therein who was an experienced military man. We ruled that an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous, or even present, good moral character and exemplary conduct. The fact that petitioner was a navy man -- a protector of the people -- does not mean that he is innocent of the crime charged or that he is incapable of doing it. This argument fails in light of the identification made by the victim himself and by Armando Maramba that it was petitioner who was the assailant.
	GR No. 143647 2005-11-11	YUSUKE FUKUZUME v. PEOPLE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
A No, sir.[34] Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[35]