This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2003-11-10 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| I shall now proceed to balance these constitutional values. Their correct calibration will compel the conclusion that this Court should defer the exercise of its ultimate jurisdiction over the petitions at bar out of prudence and respect to the initial exercise by the legislature of its jurisdiction over impeachment proceedings. First, judicial deferment of judgment gives due recognition to the unalterable fact that the Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the "exclusive" power to initiate impeachment proceedings and gives to the Senate the "sole" power to try and decide said cases. The grant of this power - the right to accuse on the part of the House and the right to try on the part of the Senate - to Congress is not a happenstance. At its core, impeachment is political in nature and hence its initiation and decision are best left, at least initially, to Congress, a political organ of government. The political components of impeachment are dominant and their appreciation are not fit for judicial resolution. Indeed, they are beyond the loop of judicial review. Second, judicial deferment will, at the very least, stop our descent to a constitutional crisis. Only those with the armor of invincible ignorance will cling to the fantasy that a stand-off between this Court and Congress at this time will not tear asunder our tenuous unity. There can be no debate on the proposition that impeachment is designed to protect the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances, the glue that holds together our government. If we weaken the glue, we shall be flirting with the flame of disaster. An approach that will bring this Court to an irreversible collision with Congress, a collision where there will be no victors but victims alone, is indefensible. The 1924 case of Alejandrino v. Quezon[89] teaches us that the system of checks and balances should not disturb or harm the harmony in government. This theme resonates in the 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, where Justice Laurel brightlined the desideratum that the principle of checks and balances is meant "to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government." Our government has three branches but it has but one purpose - - - to preserve our democratic republican form of government - - - and I refuse to adopt an approach that refuses to reconcile the powers of government. Third, the Court should strive to work out a constitutional equilibrium where each branch of government cannot dominate each other, an equilibrium where each branch in the exercise of its distinct power should be left alone yet bereft of a license to abuse. It is our hands that will cobble the components of this delicate constitutional equilibrium. In the discharge of this duty, Justice Frankfurter requires judges to exhibit that "rare disinterestedness of mind and purpose, a freedom from intellectual and social parochialism." The call for that quality of "rare disinterestedness" should counsel us to resist the temptation of unduly inflating judicial power and deflating the executive and legislative powers. The 1987 Constitution expanded the parameters of judicial power, but that by no means is a justification for the errant thought that the Constitution created an imperial judiciary. An imperial judiciary composed of the unelected, whose sole constituency is the blindfolded lady without the right to vote, is counter-majoritarian, hence, inherently inimical to the central ideal of democracy. We cannot pretend to be an imperial judiciary for in a government whose cornerstone rests on the doctrine of separation of powers, we cannot be the repository of all remedies. It is true that this Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution and the last bulwark of constitutional government.[90] But that does not diminish the role of the legislature as co-guardian of the Constitution. In the words of Justice Cardozo, the "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as courts."[91] Indeed, judges take an oath to preserve and protect the Constitution but so do our legislators. Fourth, we have the jurisdiction to strike down impermissible violations of constitutional standards and procedure in the exercise of the power of impeachment by Congress but the timing when the Court must wield its corrective certiorari power rests on prudential considerations. I agree that judicial review is no longer a matter of power for if it were power alone we can refuse to exercise it and yet be right. As well put by Justice Brandeis, "the most important thing we decide is what not to decide." Indeed, judicial review is now a matter of duty, and it is now wrong to abdicate its exercise. Be that as it may, the timing of its exercise depends on the sense of the situation by the Court and its sense depends on the exigencies created by the motion and movement of the impeachment proceedings and its impact on the interest of our people . We are right in ruling we have jurisdiction but the wrong timing of the exercise of our jurisdiction can negate the existence of our very jurisdiction and with catastrophic consequence. The words of former Senate President Jovito Salonga, an amicus curiae, ought to bridle our rush to judgment - - - this Court will eventually have jurisdiction but not yet. I quote his disquisition, viz:Assuming the question of propriety can be surmounted, should the Supreme Court render a decision at this time? | |||||