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AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

2015-04-21
PERALTA, J.
We have in the past been confronted with the same issues under similar factual and procedural circumstances. We find no reason to depart from the doctrines laid down in the earlier cases as we adopted in the assailed decision. In this regard, we reiterate the doctrines laid down in the cases of Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom) v. Philippine National Railways (PNR),[10] Eusebio v. Luis,[11] Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,[12] and Republic v. Sarabia.[13]
2011-02-09
VELASCO JR., J.
Except for the names of the parties and the specific lot designation involved, the relevant factual antecedents which gave rise to these consolidated petitions are, for the most part, as set forth in the Court's Decision[4] of October 15, 2003, as reiterated in a Resolution[5] dated August 9, 2005, in G.R. No. 156273 entitled Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (Heirs of Moreno), and in other earlier related cases.[6]
2008-04-14
CORONA, J.
The indisputable certainty in the present case is that there was a prior promise by the predecessor of the respondent that the expropriated properties may be recovered by the former owners once the airport is transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots were already reconveyed to their previous owners.[18] MCIAA v. CA[19] and ATO v. Gopuco[20] cited by petitioners are not applicable here. In MCIAA, the previous owner failed to prove that there was a compromise settlement.[21]  In ATO, the previous owner was not a party to the compromise agreements.[22]
2007-11-28
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Further elucidating on the right of the former owner to repurchase the expropriated property, we held in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,[46] Reyes v. National Housing Authority[47] and Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr.,[48] that where there is insufficient evidence that the former owners of expropriated properties were granted the right to repurchase the same, the latter may not insist on recovering their properties even when the public purpose for which said properties were expropriated is abandoned.