This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2011-06-28 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Thus, in numerous cases,[67] this Court, even in the absence of implementing legislation, applied directly the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions limiting land ownership to Filipinos. In Soriano v. Ong Hoo,[68] this Court ruled: x x x As the Constitution is silent as to the effects or consequences of a sale by a citizen of his land to an alien, and as both the citizen and the alien have violated the law, none of them should have a recourse against the other, and it should only be the State that should be allowed to intervene and determine what is to be done with the property subject of the violation. We have said that what the State should do or could do in such matters is a matter of public policy, entirely beyond the scope of judicial authority. (Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., 6 G. R. No. L-5996, June 27, 1956.) While the legislature has not definitely decided what policy should be followed in cases of violations against the constitutional prohibition, courts of justice cannot go beyond by declaring the disposition to be null and void as violative of the Constitution. x x x (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2009-01-13 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they are used, the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been previously used.[6] In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of "personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos. | |||||
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2008-12-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists of a minimum and maximum term called the indeterminate sentence.[25] Section 1 of the ISL provides | |||||
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2003-11-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Second, in the Ponce Cases the Cebu City ordinance granted Essel, Inc. an "irrevocable option" to purchase from Cebu City not more than 70% of the reclaimed lands. The ownership of the reclaimed lands remained with Cebu City until Essel, Inc. exercised its option to purchase. With the subsequent enactment of the Government Auditing Code (Presidential Decree No. 1445) on 11 June 1978, any sale of government land must be made only through public bidding. Thus, such an "irrevocable option" to purchase government land would now be void being contrary to the requirement of public bidding expressly required in Section 79[17] of PD No. 1445. This requirement of public bidding is reiterated in Section 379[18] of the 1991 Local Government Code.[19] Obviously, the ingenious reclamation scheme adopted in the Cebu City ordinance can no longer be followed in view of the requirement of public bidding in the sale of government lands. In the instant case, the Amended JVA is a negotiated contract which clearly contravenes Section 79 of PD No. 1445. | |||||
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2002-07-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural lands.[50] However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874. The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and | |||||
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2001-10-03 |
PARDO, J. |
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| The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,[26] aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.[27] Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.[28] | |||||