This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-11-24 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Pemberton further argues in his Comment that the presence of his counsel during the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail hearing did "not equate to an opportunity to be heard as to satisfy the purpose of the three-day notice rule."[66] Citing Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation,[67] Cabrera v. Ng,[68] and Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority,[69] Pemberton avers that an opposing party is given opportunity to be heard when he is "afforded sufficient time to study the motion and to meaningfully oppose and controvert the same."[70] Even though his counsel was able to orally comment on the Urgent Motion,[71] Pemberton was deprived of any meaningful opportunity to study and oppose it,[72] having been furnished a copy a few minutes before the hearing.[73] Marilou S. Laude also failed to provide "justifiable reason for . . . failure to comply with the three-day notice that would warrant a liberal construction of the rules."[74] | |||||
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2015-08-17 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| This same application has already been echoed in our past decisions.[44] In those cases, the Court observes that the real purpose behind the requirement of notice of hearing is to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court.[45] The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.[46] Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process has substantially been complied with. | |||||