This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-09-23 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| On the issue of compensability, there is no question that respondent's condition — "coronary artery disease, three-vessel involvement" — is a covered illness. It has consistently been held that cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, as well as other heart ailments, are compensable.[47] It likewise remains undisputed that given his 12 years of employment with petitioners and the conditions he was subjected to as a seafarer, respondent's illness can be attributed to his work. As correctly held by the CA, there is a reasonable connection between respondent's work and the development and exacerbation of his heart ailment. During his employment as seafarer, respondent was consistently exposed to varying temperatures and harsh weather conditions as the ship crossed ocean boundaries, and he may have been required to perform overtime work. Indeed, "any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body."[48] Moreover, as seafarer, respondent was constantly plagued by homesickness and emotional strain as he is separated from his family, even as he had to contend with the perils of the sea while at work.[49] | |||||
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2015-06-15 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. v. Balasta[33] the Court held that the "company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days, pursuant to Article 192 (c)(l) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. If he fails to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled." | |||||
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2015-01-26 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| On the issue of attorney's fees, we have held that where an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest, as in this case, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the award.[24] Thus, respondent is also entitled to US$6,000 as attorney's fees. | |||||
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2014-10-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In many cases decided in the past, this Court has held that cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and other heart ailments are compensable. Thus, in Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. v. Balasta,[28] severe 3-vessel coronary artery disease which the seaman contracted while serving as Able Seaman was considered an occupational disease. In Villanueva, Sr. v. Baliwag Navigation, Inc.,[29] it was held that the 2000 POEA-SEC considers heart disease as an occupational disease. In Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag,[30] the Court held that hypertensive cardiovascular disease may be a compensable illness, upon proof. In Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Bastol[31] and Heirs of the late Aniban v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] it was held that myocardial infarction as a disease or cause of death is compensable, such being occupational. Iloreta v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.[33] held that hypertensive cardiovascular disease/coronary artery disease and chronic stable angina are compensable. Micronesia Resources v. Cantomayor[34] stated that a finding of coronary artery disease entitles the claimant a seaman Third Officer to disability compensation. In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[35] the Court held that the claimant a musician on board an ocean-going vessel was entitled to recover for suffering from coronary artery disease. In Sepulveda v. Employees' Compensation Commission,[36] it was declared that the employee's illness, myocardial infarction, was directly brought about by his employment as schoolteacher or was a result of the nature of such employment. | |||||
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2014-10-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Having worked for petitioners since 1988 under employment contracts that were continuously renewed, it can be said that respondent spent much of his productive years with petitioners; his years of service certainly took a toll on his body, and he could not have contracted his illness elsewhere except while working for petitioners. To be sure, the Court has ruled that "the list of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-A[40] does not preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties."[41] And equally significant, "it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity."[42] | |||||
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2014-04-02 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc., et al. v. Balasta,[23] we held that the "company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days, pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. If he fails to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled." This definite assessment of the seaman's permanent disability must include the degree of his disability, as required by Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC, to wit: SEC. 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS | |||||