This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-01-12 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In sum, we find no cogent reason to depart from the decision of the trial and appellate courts. Bosito is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9346;[18] and with all the accessory penalties provided by law. As for damages, the CA awarded these amounts: (1) P50,000 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000 as moral damages; (3) P25,000 as temperate damages; and (4) P30,000 as exemplary damages. To conform with recent jurisprudence,[19] the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the CA is hereby increased to P75,000. Moreover, the amounts of damages awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. | |||||
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2012-02-08 |
SERENO, J. |
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| We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third Amended Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family.[43] It is only during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors. Thus, while it was not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State. | |||||
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2010-03-30 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Protesting its sequestration and the take-over of its warehouse at the South Harbor in Port Area, Manila, Heacock sought to intervene[5] in Civil Case No. 0002, alleging that petitioner had arbitrarily and forcibly taken over the warehouse which it (petitioner) had leased to Greenfil Corporation, Inc. (Greenfil), despite the fact that it (Heacock) had already agreed to lease the same to the Inland Group of Companies (Inland). | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In their Comment,[18] however, respondent argues that the Partial Compromise Agreement aimed to suspend only legal actions against each other with respect to the obligations covered by MPC Nos. 0002 and 0004. It invoked its legal and contractual rights to transfer the MPCs and that such transfer cannot be construed as an action against petitioners. | |||||
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2006-01-20 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| SEC. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition [for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceedings in the case. The governing rule, in fine, is that to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of certiorari proceedings, there must be an interrupting restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. [73] There was none in the instant case. Accordingly, it was in order for the respondent court to proceed with the separate trial in Civil Case No. 0002 and necessarily in rendering a judgment, in this instance, the Partial Decision, which, in its estimation, is called for by the facts and law of the case. | |||||