Lawyerly

GR No. 198745

2016-01-13

BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK v. SUNNYSIDE HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

REYES, J.

Lastly, in view of absence of bad faith by PCIB in the questioned mortgage loan, the Court agrees that in addition to the loan amount of P1,700,000.00, Mover should pay thereon to BDO legal interest at 12%per annum from the time it is due pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, except that with the efiectivity of Monetary Board Circular No. 799, the rate of interest for the loan shall be reduced to six percent (6%) per annum from and after July 1, 2013.[44]

GR No. 183681

2015-07-27

SPO2 ROLANDO JAMACA v. PEOPLE

PERALTA, J.

Petitioner's argument that the CA should have dismissed the petition outright because private complainant committed forum shopping by filing similar complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and the Office of the City Prosecutor, should not be given consideration. The Court stated in De Guzman v. Ochoa,[16] that failure to comply with the requirements on the rule against forum shopping is not a ground for the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint because the rules are clear that said issue shall cause the dismissal of the case only upon motion and after hearing.[17] More importantly, as the Court held in S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada,[18] to wit:It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.

GR No. 201892

2015-07-22

NORLINDA S. MARILAG v. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN extinguished by novation[40] the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one,[41] which was not shown here.

GR No. 202632

2015-07-08

ROBERTO STA. ANA DY v. BONIFACIO A. YU

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It bears to stress that power of the court to award attorney's fees demands factual, legal, and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.[129] In fact, such failure or oversight of the trial court cannot even be supplanted by the CA. As elucidated in the case of S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada:[130]

GR No. 202789

2015-06-22

CIR v. PUREGOLD DUTY FREE

VELASCO JR., J.

It is well settled that matters that were neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal[13] and are barred by estoppel.[14] To allow the contrary would constitute a violation of the other party's right to due process, and is contrary to the principle of fair play. In Ayala Land Incorporation v. Castillo,[15] this Court held that: It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.

GR No. 193890

2015-03-11

ESTANISLAO v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

REYES, J.

The subject three PNs bear interests ranging from 21% to 23% per annum, exclusive of penalty of 1% on the overdue amount per month of delay, whereas in its complaint, Chinabank prayed to recover only the legal rate of 12% on whatever judgment it could obtain. Meanwhile, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas in its Resolution No. 796 dated May 16, 2013, and now embodied in Monetary Board Circular No. 799, has effective July 1, 2013 reduced to 6%, from 12%, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of stipulation.[45] Since Chinabank demanded only the legal, not the stipulated, interest rate on the deficiency and attorney's fees due, the defendants will solidarily pay interest on their shares in the deficiency at the rate of 12% from November 18, 1998 to June 30, 2013, and 6% from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

GR No. 211424

2014-11-26

DAVAO HOLIDAY TRANSPORT SERVICES CORPORATION v. SPS. EULOGIO AND CARMELITA EMPHASIS

REYES, J.

In light of prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the reckoning date of the 6% per annum interest on the monetary awards must, however, be modified. It bears emphasis that the damages imposed upon the petitioner, as Tungal's employer, were the result of a separate complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the New Civil Code. Consistent with pertinent jurisprudence, the interest on these awards must be computed from the date when the RTC rendered its decision in the civil case, or on June 17, 2008, as it was at this time that a quantification of the damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained.[9] The CA's increase of the rate of interest to 12% per annum from the date of finality of judgment must also be rectified. Under Circular No. 799 issued by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, "[t]he rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum." From the finality of a judgment awarding a sum of money until it is satisfied, the award shall be considered a forbearance of credit, regardless of whether the award in fact pertained to one.[10] To be consistent with the foregoing, the interest on the monetary awards shall then be fixed at 6% per annum, until the damages are fully paid.

GR No. 160107

2014-10-22

SPS. JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN v. BPI FAMILY BANK

BERSAMIN, J.

The CA confined its resolution to these issues. Accordingly, the petitioners could not raise the applicability of Republic Act No. 6552, or the strict construction of the loan agreement for being a contract of adhesion as issues for the first time either in their motion for reconsideration or in their petition filed in this Court. To allow them to do so would violate the adverse parties' right to fairness and due process. As the Court held in S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada:[26]

GR No. 194507

2014-09-08

FEDERAL BUILDERS v. FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS

PERALTA, J.

In S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Engr. Parada,[24] We clarified the meaning of obligations constituting loans or forbearance of money in the following wise: As further clarified in the case of Sunga-Chan v. CA, a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credit describes a contractual obligation whereby a lender or creditor has refrained during a given period from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and payable. Thus:

GR No. 174433

2014-02-24

PHILIPPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. ENRIQUE MANALO AND ROSALINDA JACINTO

BERSAMIN, J.

Anent the correct rates of interest to be applied on the amount to be refunded by PNB, the Court, in Nacar v. Gallery Frames[45] and S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada,[46] already applied Monetary Board Circular No. 799 by reducing the interest rates allowed in judgments from 12% per annum to 6% per annum.[47] According to Nacar v. Gallery Frames, MB Circular No. 799 is applied prospectively, and judgments that became final and executory prior to its effectivity on July 1, 2013 are not to be disturbed but continue to be implemented applying the old legal rate of 12% per annum. Hence, the old legal rate of 12% per annum applied to judgments becoming final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, but the new rate of 6% per annum applies to judgments becoming final and executory after said dater.

	GR No. 198745 2016-01-13	BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK v. SUNNYSIDE HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION REYES, J.
Lastly, in view of absence of bad faith by PCIB in the questioned mortgage loan, the Court agrees that in addition to the loan amount of P1,700,000.00, Mover should pay thereon to BDO legal interest at 12%per annum from the time it is due pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, except that with the efiectivity of Monetary Board Circular No. 799, the rate of interest for the loan shall be reduced to six percent (6%) per annum from and after July 1, 2013.[44]
	GR No. 183681 2015-07-27	SPO2 ROLANDO JAMACA v. PEOPLE PERALTA, J.
Petitioner's argument that the CA should have dismissed the petition outright because private complainant committed forum shopping by filing similar complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and the Office of the City Prosecutor, should not be given consideration. The Court stated in De Guzman v. Ochoa,[16] that failure to comply with the requirements on the rule against forum shopping is not a ground for the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint because the rules are clear that said issue shall cause the dismissal of the case only upon motion and after hearing.[17] More importantly, as the Court held in S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada,[18] to wit:It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
	GR No. 201892 2015-07-22	NORLINDA S. MARILAG v. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN extinguished by novation[40] the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one,[41] which was not shown here.
	GR No. 202632 2015-07-08	ROBERTO STA. ANA DY v. BONIFACIO A. YU PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It bears to stress that power of the court to award attorney's fees demands factual, legal, and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.[129] In fact, such failure or oversight of the trial court cannot even be supplanted by the CA. As elucidated in the case of S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada:[130]
	GR No. 202789 2015-06-22	CIR v. PUREGOLD DUTY FREE VELASCO JR., J.
It is well settled that matters that were neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal[13] and are barred by estoppel.[14] To allow the contrary would constitute a violation of the other party's right to due process, and is contrary to the principle of fair play. In Ayala Land Incorporation v. Castillo,[15] this Court held that: It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
	GR No. 193890 2015-03-11	ESTANISLAO v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION REYES, J.
The subject three PNs bear interests ranging from 21% to 23% per annum, exclusive of penalty of 1% on the overdue amount per month of delay, whereas in its complaint, Chinabank prayed to recover only the legal rate of 12% on whatever judgment it could obtain. Meanwhile, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas in its Resolution No. 796 dated May 16, 2013, and now embodied in Monetary Board Circular No. 799, has effective July 1, 2013 reduced to 6%, from 12%, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of stipulation.[45] Since Chinabank demanded only the legal, not the stipulated, interest rate on the deficiency and attorney's fees due, the defendants will solidarily pay interest on their shares in the deficiency at the rate of 12% from November 18, 1998 to June 30, 2013, and 6% from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
	GR No. 211424 2014-11-26	DAVAO HOLIDAY TRANSPORT SERVICES CORPORATION v. SPS. EULOGIO AND CARMELITA EMPHASIS REYES, J.
In light of prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the reckoning date of the 6% per annum interest on the monetary awards must, however, be modified. It bears emphasis that the damages imposed upon the petitioner, as Tungal's employer, were the result of a separate complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the New Civil Code. Consistent with pertinent jurisprudence, the interest on these awards must be computed from the date when the RTC rendered its decision in the civil case, or on June 17, 2008, as it was at this time that a quantification of the damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained.[9] The CA's increase of the rate of interest to 12% per annum from the date of finality of judgment must also be rectified. Under Circular No. 799 issued by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, "[t]he rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum." From the finality of a judgment awarding a sum of money until it is satisfied, the award shall be considered a forbearance of credit, regardless of whether the award in fact pertained to one.[10] To be consistent with the foregoing, the interest on the monetary awards shall then be fixed at 6% per annum, until the damages are fully paid.
	GR No. 160107 2014-10-22	SPS. JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN v. BPI FAMILY BANK BERSAMIN, J.
The CA confined its resolution to these issues. Accordingly, the petitioners could not raise the applicability of Republic Act No. 6552, or the strict construction of the loan agreement for being a contract of adhesion as issues for the first time either in their motion for reconsideration or in their petition filed in this Court. To allow them to do so would violate the adverse parties' right to fairness and due process. As the Court held in S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada:[26]
	GR No. 194507 2014-09-08	FEDERAL BUILDERS v. FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS PERALTA, J.
In S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Engr. Parada,[24] We clarified the meaning of obligations constituting loans or forbearance of money in the following wise: As further clarified in the case of Sunga-Chan v. CA, a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credit describes a contractual obligation whereby a lender or creditor has refrained during a given period from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and payable. Thus:
	GR No. 174433 2014-02-24	PHILIPPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. ENRIQUE MANALO AND ROSALINDA JACINTO BERSAMIN, J.
Anent the correct rates of interest to be applied on the amount to be refunded by PNB, the Court, in Nacar v. Gallery Frames[45] and S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada,[46] already applied Monetary Board Circular No. 799 by reducing the interest rates allowed in judgments from 12% per annum to 6% per annum.[47] According to Nacar v. Gallery Frames, MB Circular No. 799 is applied prospectively, and judgments that became final and executory prior to its effectivity on July 1, 2013 are not to be disturbed but continue to be implemented applying the old legal rate of 12% per annum. Hence, the old legal rate of 12% per annum applied to judgments becoming final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, but the new rate of 6% per annum applies to judgments becoming final and executory after said dater.

S.C. MEGAWORLD CONSTRUCTION v. ENGR. LUIS U. PARADA