This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2015-09-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| Also, the lower courts' resort to circumstantial evidence was perfectly in order. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused can no longer be proved by any other evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct evidence.[10] Said reliance on circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which, to warrant the conviction of an accused, requires that: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime.[11] Here, there exist sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to the Bañez brothers as among the ones responsible for Baylon's death. The prosecution was able to establish that: (1) the house of accused-appellant Randy Bañez was burned just a few hours before the incident; (2) Baylon shouted, "I have no fault!" when Rufino hit him with an iron bar, while the Bañezes held his arms; (3) the accused thereafter brought Baylon to the house of Ramil Bañez; and (4) Baylon's lifeless body was discovered the following morning near Ramil's house. Moreover, accused-appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[12] There was likewise motive on the part of the Bañez brothers to hurt Baylon, since they had suspected him to have been the one responsible for the burning of Randy's house. The totality of the aforementioned facts point to them, to the exclusion of others, as the perpetrators of the crime. | |||||
|
2014-07-28 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.[38] | |||||
|
2014-01-15 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."[21] While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA's credibility. | |||||