This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-09-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Also, the lower courts' resort to circumstantial evidence was perfectly in order. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused can no longer be proved by any other evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct evidence.[10] Said reliance on circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which, to warrant the conviction of an accused, requires that: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime.[11] Here, there exist sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to the Bañez brothers as among the ones responsible for Baylon's death. The prosecution was able to establish that: (1) the house of accused-appellant Randy Bañez was burned just a few hours before the incident; (2) Baylon shouted, "I have no fault!" when Rufino hit him with an iron bar, while the Bañezes held his arms; (3) the accused thereafter brought Baylon to the house of Ramil Bañez; and (4) Baylon's lifeless body was discovered the following morning near Ramil's house. Moreover, accused-appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[12] There was likewise motive on the part of the Bañez brothers to hurt Baylon, since they had suspected him to have been the one responsible for the burning of Randy's house. The totality of the aforementioned facts point to them, to the exclusion of others, as the perpetrators of the crime. | |||||
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2015-01-26 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue."[18] | |||||
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2014-11-26 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of P14,170.35 as compensatory damages "representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven."[15] We need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,[16] we emphatically declared to be "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery." We explained why in the following manner:It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. | |||||
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2014-10-08 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delicto because no evidence had been adduced thereon.[20] The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however, because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victim's feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a plain error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People,[21] it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner: It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. | |||||
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2014-07-23 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People,[30] it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner: It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. | |||||
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2014-06-25 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the CA was not disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People[19] that it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," because: It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. | |||||
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2014-03-10 |
ABAD, J. |
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| The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.[11] This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [12] | |||||