This case has been cited 4 times or more.
2014-12-03 |
LEONEN, J. |
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Justice Brion's dissenting opinion in Abott Laboratories, PhiIippines v. AIcaraz[130] discussed that in petitions for review under Rule 45, "the Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of the CA's finding that the NLRC ruling . . . had basis in fact and in Iaw."[131] In this kind of petition, the proper question to be raised is, "Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?"[132] | |||||
2014-04-22 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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In this relation, it bears mentioning that the performance standard contemplated by law should not, in all cases, be contained in a specialized system of feedbacks or evaluation. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that not all employers, such as simple businesses or small-scale enterprises, have a sophisticated form of human resource management, so much so that the adoption of technical indicators as utilized through "comment cards" or "appraisal" tools should not be treated as a prerequisite for every case of probationary engagement. In fact, even if a system of such kind is employed and the procedures for its implementation are not followed, once an employer determines that the probationary employee fails to meet the standards required for his regularization, the former is not precluded from dismissing the latter. The rule is that when a valid cause for termination exists, the procedural infirmity attending the termination only warrants the payment of nominal damages. This was the principle laid down in the landmark cases of Agabon v. NLRC[9] (Agabon) and Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot[10] (Jaka). In the assailed Decision, the Court actually extended the application of the Agabon and Jaka rulings to breaches of company procedure, notwithstanding the employer's compliance with the statutory requirements under the Labor Code.[11] Hence, although Abbott did not comply with its own termination procedure, its non-compliance thereof would not detract from the finding that there subsists a valid cause to terminate Alcaraz's employment. Abbott, however, was penalized for its contractual breach and thereby ordered to pay nominal damages. | |||||
2014-04-07 |
REYES, J. |
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On the issue of the solidary obligation of the corporate officers impleaded vis-à-vis the corporation for Mapua's illegal dismissal, "[i]t is hornbook principle that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (b) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written objection; (c) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (d) they are made by specific provision of law personally answerable for their corporate action."[53] | |||||
2013-10-23 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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The factual circumstances of the case reveal that Gabuya committed forum shopping when she filed a petition for review before the CA, i.e., the CA Petition, seeking to reverse and set aside the Ombudsman's February 28, 2006 Decision dismissing her from service, notwithstanding the pendency before the Ombudsman of her motion for reconsideration of the same decision praying for the same relief. In relation thereto, she also failed to comply with the requirements of a certificate against forum shopping under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court[26] (certification requirement) since the certificate she attached to the CA Petition did not include a "complete statement of the present status" of the aforesaid motion for reconsideration pending before the Ombudsman. Notably, the act of forum shopping and the violation of the certification requirement while considered as peculiar procedural infractions similarly constitute grounds for the dismissal of the case. As explained in Abbott Laboratories Phils. v. Alcaraz:[27] |