This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-06-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Anent the nature of disability caused by his work-related illness, the Court notes that Gazzingan was no longer provided work after being diagnosed with aortic dissection/dissecting aneurysm. He was constrained to seek further medical attention at his own expense and was continuously unable to work until his death. Thus, the Court is inclined to rule that Gazzingan suffered from a permanent total disability as he was unable to return to his regular job for more than one hundred twenty days.[51] Accordingly, his permanent total disability benefits should be US$60,000.00 or 120% of US$50,000.00, pursuant to the Schedule of Disability Allowances under the POEA-SEC. The Labor Arbiter thus erred in fixing his disability benefits at US$50,000.00. As regards sickness allowance, the award of US$1,300.00 for his incapacity to work for 120 days was proper. The grant of attorney’s fees is likewise affirmed for being justified in accordance with Article 2208(2)[52] of the Civil Code since respondents were compelled to litigate to satisfy their claims for Gazzingan’s disability benefits.[53] | |||||
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2015-01-26 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The parties agreed in their May 22, 2000 employment contract that they will comply with the 1996 POEA-SEC. Hence, we will apply the 1996 POEA-SEC and not the 2000 POEA-SEC which initially took effect on June 25, 2000 but whose implementation was suspended until the suspension was lifted on June 5, 2002.[16] | |||||
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2014-11-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| As elucidated in Canuel, the foregoing liberal approach was applied in Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated v. Candava,[67] Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo,[68] and Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC,[69] wherein the Court had previously allowed the recovery of death benefits even if the seafarers in those cases had died after repatriation, given that there was proof of a clear causal connection between their work and the illness which was contracted in the course of employment, and their eventual death. The converse conclusion was reached in the cases of Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin[70] (Gau Sheng), Spouses Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp.[71] (Spouses Aya-ay, Sr.), Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc.,[72] Prudential Shipping and Management Corp. v. Sta. Rita[73] (Prudential), and Ortega v. CA[74] (Ortega), since the element of work-relatedness had not been established. All in all, the sense gathered from these cases, as pointed out in Canuel, is that it is crucial to determine whether the death of the deceased was reasonably connected with his work, or whether the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease that resulted in the seafarer's death. If the injury or illness is the proximate cause, or at least increased the risk of his death for which compensation is sought, recovery may be had for said death, or for that matter, for the injury or illness. Thus, in Seagull Shipmanagement and Trans., Inc. v. NLRC,[75] the Court significantly observed that: Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him of compensation benefits. For what matters is that his work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death. Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease. [76] (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) | |||||
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2014-10-13 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| More recently, in the 2013 case of Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated v. Candava,[70] also decided under the framework of the 1996 POEA-SEC, the Court pronounced that the seafarer's death therein, despite occurring after his repatriation, remains "compensable for having been caused by an illness duly established to have been contracted in the course of his employment."[71] | |||||
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2014-06-04 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Employment contracts of seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels are not ordinary contracts. They are regulated and an imprimatur by the State is necessary. While the seafarer and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and Regulations require that the POEA-SEC be integrated in every seafarer's contract.[15] In this case, there is no dispute that Caseñas' employment contract was duly approved by the POEA and that it incorporated the provisions of the POEA-SEC. | |||||