This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-11-16 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The relationship between Atty. Dabon and Sonia was consensual. Relationships between men and women traditionally involve power exerted by one against the other. In Garcia v. Drilon,[37] this court recognized the unequal power relationship between a man and a woman, justifying the valid classification provided under Republic Act No. 9262:[38] | |||||
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2015-11-16 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."[39] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) | |||||
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2015-04-07 |
REYES, J. |
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| "The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary."[22] "The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid."[23] | |||||
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2015-02-09 |
REYES, J. |
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| It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC[20] explicitly prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,[21] the Court declared that: Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. x x x.[22] (Emphasis deleted) | |||||
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2014-06-16 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon[26] the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women. | |||||
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2014-01-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in his Comment to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC. However, without awaiting for the resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the Constitution. Contrary to the CA's finding that the matter raised in the petition filed with it was the RTC's alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO which could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions, we find that since petitioner is assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's right to a protection order is based upon, the constitutionality of the said law must first be decided upon. After all, the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.[12] Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to declare RA 9262 unconstitutional. | |||||
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2013-11-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In 1950, it has been documented[15] that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they 'being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders.'"[16] During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator's allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.[17] In the 1960's, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.[18] | |||||