This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-07-02 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Prefatorily, we note that respondent Evelyn Camilon did not appeal or file a petition for certiorari to assail the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the NLRC finding her grossly and habitually negligent in her duties for failing to regularly pre-audit the school cashier's report, check the entries therein and keep the custody of the petty cash fund which negligence resulted in the school cashier's (Loba) misappropriation of school funds and students' tuition fees. It is axiomatic that a party who does not appeal or file a petition for certiorari is not entitled to any affirmative relief.[18] An appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.[19] Thus, for failure of respondent to assail the validity of her dismissal, such ruling is no longer in issue. | |||||
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2014-02-05 |
REYES, J. |
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| In Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera,[37] the Court laid down in detail the steps on how to comply with procedural due process in terminating an employee, viz:(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees. | |||||
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2014-01-29 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| It must be stressed at the outset that the correctness of the Labor Arbiter's pronouncement on the legality of Del Rosario's dismissal is no longer an issue and is beyond modification. While Manila Water timely appealed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter awarding separation pay to Del Rosario, the latter did not question the dismissal of his illegal termination case.[18] It is settled in our jurisprudence that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the appealed decision.[19] Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.[20] Having said that, this Court will no longer dwell on the issue of whether or not Del Rosario was illegally dismissed from employment. Included in the closed aspect of the case is respondent's argument that the absence of his counsel when he admitted the charge against him diminished the evidentiary value of such admission. Nonetheless, it may be mentioned that the constitutional right to counsel is available only during custodial investigation. If the investigation is merely administrative conducted by the employer and not a criminal investigation, the admission made during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify dismissal.[21] | |||||
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2013-09-18 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| As pronounced in the recent case of Unilever Philippines, Inc., v. Rivera,[39] an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282[40] of the Labor Code, including breach of trust, is not entitled to separation pay.[41] This is further bolstered by Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which provides that:Sec. 7. Termination of employment by employer. The just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in the Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice. | |||||
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2013-08-19 |
REYES, J. |
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| We emphasize that the appeal to the CA was brought not by Daabay but by Coca-Cola, and was limited to the issue of whether or not the award of retirement benefits in favor of Daabay was proper. Insofar as CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN was concerned, the correctness of the NLRC's pronouncement on the legality of Daabay's dismissal was no longer an issue, even beyond the appellate court's authority to modify. In Andaya v. NLRC,[26] the Court emphasized that a party who has not appealed from a decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.[27] Further, we explained in Yano v. Sanchez,[28] that the entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that he can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised below only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor.[29] Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.[30] Considering that Daabay had not yet appealed from the NLRC's Resolution to the CA, his plea for the modification of the NLRC's findings was then misplaced. For the Court to review all matters that are raised in the petition would be tolerant of what Daabay was barred to do before the appellate court. | |||||