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SPS. DEO AGNER AND MARICON AGNER v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 182210 2015-10-05	PAZ T. BERNARDO v. PEOPLE BRION, J.
Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment carries the burden of proving it.[70] Indeed, once the existence of an indebtedness is established by evidence, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment rests with the debtor.[71] After the debtor introduces evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - again shifts to the creditor, who then labors under a duty to produce evidence to show nonpayment.[72]
	GR No. 201892 2015-07-22	NORLINDA S. MARILAG v. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Records show that other than the matter of interest, the principal loan obligation and the payments made were not disputed by the parties. Nonetheless, the Court finds the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be excessive and unconscionable. In a plethora of cases, the Court has affirmed that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant,[51] hence, illegal[52] and void for being contrary to morals.[53] In Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.,[54] the Court had the occasion to rule:Settled is the principle which this Court has affirmed in a number of cases that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant. While Central Bank Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on said interest rate; thus, the interest rate may be reduced as reason and equity demand. (Emphases supplied)
	GR No. 187487 2015-06-29	GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO. v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Of particular note is the affirmative defense of payment raised during the proceedings a quo. While petitioners insisted that they had paid, albeit partially, their loan obligation to respondent, the fact of such payment was never established by petitioners in this case. Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant, i.e., petitioners, to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof of non-payment is not needed for it is presumed.[54] Here, respondent's possession of the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA, especially with their genuineness and due execution already having been admitted, cements its claim that the obligation of petitioners has not been extinguished. Instructive too is the Court's disquisition in Jison v. CA[55] on the evidentiary burdens attendant in a civil proceeding, to wit:Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.[56]
	GR No. 204672 2015-02-18	SPS. RODOLFO AND MARCELINA GUEVARRA v. COMMONER LENDING CORPORATION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Moreover, the Court notes that the stipulated three percent (3%) monthly interest is excessive and unconscionable.In a plethora of cases, the Court has affirmed that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant,[63] hence, illegal[64] and void for being contrary to morals.[65] In Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.,[66] the Court had the occasion to rule: Settled is the principle which this Court has affirmed in a number of cases that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant. While Central Bank Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on said interest rate; thus, the interest rate may be reduced as reason and equity demand. (Emphases supplied)[67]
	GR No. 180144 2014-09-24	LEONARDO BOGNOT v. RRI LENDING CORPORATION BRION, J.
Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it;[17] the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.[18] Indeed, once the existence of an indebtedness is duly established by evidence, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment rests on the debtor.[19]
	GR No. 180069 2014-03-05	PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. ARTURO P. FRANCO PERALTA, J.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.[8] Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.[9] When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove non-payment for it is presumed.[10] The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment.[11]