This case has been cited 12 times or more.
2015-12-09 |
PEREZ, J. |
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It has been repeatedly emphasized that for illness to be compensable, the nature of employment need not be the lone reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer.[69] Just a reasonable connection, and not absolute certainty, between the danger of contracting the illness and its aggravation resulting from the working conditions is enough to sustain its compensability.[70] In the words of the Court:x x x. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease x x x.[71] | |||||
2015-09-23 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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On the issue of compensability, there is no question that respondent's condition — "coronary artery disease, three-vessel involvement" — is a covered illness. It has consistently been held that cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, as well as other heart ailments, are compensable.[47] It likewise remains undisputed that given his 12 years of employment with petitioners and the conditions he was subjected to as a seafarer, respondent's illness can be attributed to his work. As correctly held by the CA, there is a reasonable connection between respondent's work and the development and exacerbation of his heart ailment. During his employment as seafarer, respondent was consistently exposed to varying temperatures and harsh weather conditions as the ship crossed ocean boundaries, and he may have been required to perform overtime work. Indeed, "any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body."[48] Moreover, as seafarer, respondent was constantly plagued by homesickness and emotional strain as he is separated from his family, even as he had to contend with the perils of the sea while at work.[49] | |||||
2015-08-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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Consequently, for CVD to constitute as an occupational disease for which the seafarer may claim compensation, it is incumbent upon said seafarer to show that he developed the same under any of the three conditions identified above.[33] | |||||
2015-06-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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At first glance, it is obvious that the petition prays for this Court to conduct a re-examination of the facts and evidence on record, a task which is not the Supreme Court's, but the NLRC's and the Court of Appeals' function to perform. Basic is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and this rule applies with greater force in labor cases.[43] Questions of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve.[44] It is elementary that the scope of this Court's judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law and does not extend to questions of fact.[45] | |||||
2015-06-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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“Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, two elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable. First, the injury or illness must be work-related; and second, x x x the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.”[25] The 2000 POEA-SEC defines work-related injury and work-related illness as – | |||||
2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel[50] also recognized that the nature of employment can possibly aggravate a pre-existing illness. However, the causation between the nature of employment and the aggravation of the illness must still be proven before compensation may be granted. | |||||
2014-11-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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The issue of whether the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered may be determined from the pertinent provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC[68] which enumerates the duties of an employer to his employee who suffers a work-related injury or disease during the term of his employment,[69] viz.: SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS | |||||
2014-11-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (B) (4) of the same explicitly provides that "[t[he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related." In other words, the 2000 POEA-SEC "has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability[,] saying that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption."[52] This presumption should be overturned only when the employer's refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence,[53] which, as traditionally defined is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."[54] As held in the case of Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel:[55] | |||||
2014-10-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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However, the Court finds that Bengson's illness is work-related. The undisputed facts indicate that respondent has been working for petitioners since 1988; that per his service record,[37] he has been serving as Third Mate for twelve (12) years; and that as Third Mate, he was saddled with heavy responsibilities relative to navigation of the vessel, ship safety and management of emergencies. It is beyond doubt that respondent was subjected to physical and mental stress and strain: as Third Mate, he is the ship's fourth in command, and he is the ship's safety officer; these responsibilities have been heavy burdens on respondent's shoulders all these years, and certainly contributed to the development of his illness. Besides, "[i]t is already recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body."[38] "Notably, it is a matter of judicial notice that an overseas worker, having to ward off homesickness by reason of being physically separated from his family for the entire duration of his contract, bears a great degree of emotional strain while making an effort to perform his work well. The strain is even greater in the case of a seaman who is constantly subjected to the perils of the sea while at work abroad and away from his family."[39] | |||||
2014-07-30 |
REYES, J. |
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The Court is not a trier of facts hence, only questions of law, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. It is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again in view of the corollary legal precept that findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on this Court. Nevertheless, the Court will proceed to probe and resolve factual issues when any of these exceptional circumstances are present, viz: when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or,[26] where the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the LA and the NLRC.[27] | |||||
2014-03-03 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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x x x His constant exposure to hazards such as chemicals and the varying temperature, like the heat in the kitchen of the vessel and the coldness outside, coupled by stressful tasks in his employment caused, or at least aggravated, his illness. It is already recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body.[34] | |||||
2014-02-26 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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compensable, the seafarer must establish that there exists "a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had."[40] In other words, not only must the seafarer establish that his injury or illness rendered him permanently or partially disabled, it is equally pertinent that he shows a causal connection between such injury or illness and the work for which he had been contracted.[41] In this case, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the LA's findings that Ayungo is entitled to disability benefits on the ground that Beamko and Eagle Maritime assumed the risk of liability of his weakened condition.[42] Beamko and Eagle |