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SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 219603 2016-01-26	MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL CARPIO, J.
Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office.[30] This is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office.[31] In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections,[32] we held that if a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
	GR Nos. 217126-27 2015-11-10	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[311] It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."[312]
	GR No. 202645 2015-08-05	FORTUNATO R. BARON v. EPE TRANSPORT PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[46] It has also been held that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[47] The existence of such patent violation evinces that the assailed judicial or quasi-judicial act is tainted with the quality of whim and caprice, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
	GR No. 211263 2015-08-05	OKS DESIGNTECH v. MARY JAYNE L. CACCAM PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[32] It has also been held that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[33] The existence of such patent violation evinces that the assailed judicial or quasi-judicial act is snared with the quality of whim and caprice, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
	GR No. 184045 2014-01-22	SPS. NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ v. SPS. CARLITO ALINDOG AND CARMEN ALINDOG PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
That said, the RTC therefore gravely abused its discretion when it issued the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[49] Here, while the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting Sps. Alindog's prayer for injunctive relief. The RTC's finding anent the initial evidence adduced by Sps. Alindog constitutes improper basis to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in their favor since, in the first place, it had no authority to exercise any discretion in this respect. Jurisprudence is clear on the matter: without the exception under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules availing, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of an extra-judicially foreclosed property such as Sps. Marquez in this case should come as a matter of course, and, in such regard, constitutes only a ministerial duty on the part of the court. Besides, it was improper for the RTC to have issued a writ of preliminary injunction since the act sought to be enjoined, i.e., the implementation of the writ of possession, had already been accomplished in the interim and thus, rendered the matter moot. Case law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or consummated act).[50] Hence, since the consummation of the act sought to be restrained had rendered Sps. Alindog's injunction petition moot, the issuance of the said injunctive writ was altogether improper.