This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-11-25 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Here, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) only disputes the locus standi of petitioner who has filed this suit in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer.[24] In view of the earlier dispositions by the Court in similar public law cases initiated by petitioner, we again affirm his locus standi to bring a suit of this nature. In Funa v. Agra,[25] the Court has recently held:x x x [T]he locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit of this nature has already been settled in his favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law litigations he brought. In Funa v. Villar, for one, the Court has held: | |||||
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2014-11-19 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Funa v. Agra[36] defines who a de facto officer is and explains that his acts are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned, viz.: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging [his] duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.[37] | |||||
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2014-10-15 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| In Funa v. Agra,[41] a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding concurrent positions as the acting Secretary of justice and as Solicitor General. This court, while ruling that the appointment of Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of Justice violated Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, held that he was a de facto officer during his tenure in the Department of Justice: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a dejure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. | |||||
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2013-12-10 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that [she] is not a mere volunteer,"[59] that is, not through her own actions but through those of the IBP Board of Governors. Thus, she did so under "color of authority," as defined in settled jurisprudence (e.g., Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,[60] Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit,[61] and Dennis A.B. Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra[62]). | |||||
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2013-12-10 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The de facto doctrine was devised to benefit the public. On the validity of actions made by de facto officers, it is settled that "the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned."[67] This is premised on the reality that "[t]hird persons x x x cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office. They have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such."[68] | |||||
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2013-12-10 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| To reiterate, one that is de facto is "illegitimate but in effect."[72] Thus, it is settled that "the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned."[73] This is necessary so as to protect the sanctity of their dealings with those relying on their ostensible authority: "[t]hird persons x x x cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office. They have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such."[74] | |||||
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2013-12-10 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| "The President of the IBP Southern Leyte Chapter, Porfirio P. Siaynco, was elected by the Board to replace Gov. Cirilo Montejo."[16] | |||||