This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-09-29 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| R.A. No. 8975, which took effect on November 26, 2000,[44] is the present law that proscribes lower courts from issuing restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against government infrastructure projects. In ensuring the expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects, its twin objectives are: (1) to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs; and (2) to allow the immediate enjoyment of the social and economic benefits of the project.[45] Towards these end, Sections 3 and 4 of the law provide: SEC. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: | |||||
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2014-04-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| We do not agree. The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, which states that "[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." The doctrine embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties.[20] In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts; the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other; and the one highest court does not bind itself, it being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights.[21] The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions.[22] Thus, a ruling of a particular division of the CA, while may be taken cognizance of in some cases, cannot bind or prejudice a ruling of another division thereof, the former being a co-ordinate authority and, relative to Us, is still considered as a lower court albeit empowered with an appellate jurisdiction. | |||||
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2014-02-19 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In the recent case of The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng[31] respondent issued similar temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in favor of claimants which include Magdalena Gumangan and Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. who sought to enjoin the Baguio District Engineer's Office, the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent, the Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. and the Busol Task Force from fencing the Busol Watershed Reservation. The CA affirmed respondent's orders and dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the aforesaid offices. Applying the principle of stare decisis, the Court ruled:On February 4, 2009, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 180206, a suit which involved several of the parties in the case at bar. In G.R. No. 180206, the City Mayor of Baguio City issued three Demolition Orders with respect to allegedly illegal structures constructed by private respondents therein on a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation. Private respondents filed a Petition for Injunction with the NCIP. Atty. Masweng issued two temporary restraining orders directing the City Government of Baguio to refrain from enforcing said Demolition Orders and subsequently granted private respondents' application for a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals, acting on petitioners' Petition for Certiorari, affirmed the temporary restraining orders and the writ of preliminary injunction. | |||||