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LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. BARBARA SAMPAGA POBLETE

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 213286 2015-08-26	MAMERTA LOPEZ CLAUDIO v. SPS. FEDERICO MENDOZA, J.
Besides, the evidence proffered by the petitioners tends to show that the deed of absolute sale was a forgery because the alleged vendor, Porfirio, was already dead at the time of the purported sale on June 10, 2004. In the certificate of death[25] submitted by the petitioners, it appears that Porfirio died on May 31, 1997 in Glendora, Los Angeles, U.S.A. It is a well-entrenched rule that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. Moreover, where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but, in fact, has never been paid, the deed of sale is void ab initio for lack of consideration.[26] Consequently, the purported buyer, Florentino, could not have validly mortgaged the subject property. In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void.[27]
	GR No. 177803 2015-08-03	SPS. EMILIANO L. JALBAY v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK PERALTA, J.
True, banks, in handling real estate transactions, are required to exert a higher degree of diligence, care, and prudence than individuals. Unlike private individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract.[5] Indeed, there is a situation where, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This is the doctrine of "the mortgagee in good faith," wherein buyers or mortgagees dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are no longer required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title.[6] However, the rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title is not applicable to banks. Thus, before approving a loan application, it is a standard operating practice for these institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered for mortgage and to verify the veracity of the title to determine its real owners. An ocular inspection is necessary to protect the true owner of the property as well as innocent third parties with a right, interest or claim thereon from a usurper who may have acquired a fraudulent certificate of title.[7]
	GR No. 200468 2014-03-19	MACARIA ARGUELLES v. MALARAYAT RURAL BANK VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Thus, where the mortgagor is not the registered owner of the property but is merely an attorney-in-fact of the same, it is incumbent upon the mortgagee to exercise greater care and a higher degree of prudence in dealing with such mortgagor.[22] Recently, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Poblete,[23] we affirmed Bank of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, Jr.: Based on the evidence, Land Bank processed Maniego's loan application upon his presentation of OCT No. P-12026, which was still under the name of Poblete. Land Bank even ignored the fact that Kapantay previously used Poblete's title as collateral in its loan account with Land Bank. In Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo, Jr., we held that when "the person applying for the loan is other than the registered owner of the real property being mortgaged, [such fact] should have already raised a red flag and which should have induced the Bank x x x to make inquiries into and confirm x x x [the] authority to mortgage x x x. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that could create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not an innocent purchaser for value."
	GR No. 202370 2013-09-23	JUAN SEVILLA SALAS v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA CARPIO, J.
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their marriage. Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas' name were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguila's marriage. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held that the question of whether the properties were acquired during the marriage is a factual issue. Factual findings of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us, except under compelling circumstances not present in this case.[24]
	GR No. 175428 2013-04-15	RICARDO CHU v. MELANIA CAPARAS BRION, J.
The Court's jurisdiction under a Rule 45 review is limited to reviewing perceived errors of law, which the lower courts may have committed.[28] The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings, when aptly supported by evidence, bind this Court. This is especially true when the CA affirms the lower court's findings,[29] as in this case. While this Court, under established exceptional circumstances, had deviated from the above rule, we do not find this case to be under any of the exceptions.