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PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. PRIDISONS REALTY CORPORATION

This case has been cited 3 times or more.

	GR No. 198745 2016-01-13	BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK v. SUNNYSIDE HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION REYES, J.
The Court has long recognized and upheld the rationale behind P.D. No. 957, which is to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming developers;[34] buyers who are by law entitled to the enjoyment of an open space within the subdivision. Thus, this Court has broadly construed HLURB's jurisdiction to include complaints to annul mortgages of condominium or subdivision units.[35] In The Manila Banking Corp. v. Spouses Rabina, et al,[36] the Court said: The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. To disassociate the issue of nullity of mortgage and lodge it separately with the liquidation court would only cause inconvenience to the parties and would not serve the ends of speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the laws vesting quasi-judicial powers in the agency.[37] (Citations omitted)
	GR No. 207747 2015-03-11	SPS. CHIN KONG WONG CHOI AND ANA O. CHUA v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK CARPIO, J.
As for UCPB's alleged solidary liability, we do not find any merit in the claim of Spouses Choi that Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez[47] and Philippine Bank of Communications v. Pridisons Realty Corporation[48] apply to the present case. Both cases involved the failure to comply with Sections 17, 18 and 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957, which made the banks in those cases solidarily liable. A solidary obligation cannot be inferred lightly, but exists only when expressly stated, or the law or nature of the obligation requires it.[49]
	GR No. 182128 2014-02-19	PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. TERESITA TAN DEE REYES, J.
Nevertheless, despite the apparent validity of the mortgage between the petitioner and PEPI, the former is still bound to respect the transactions between respondents PEPI and Dee. The petitioner was well aware that the properties mortgaged by PEPI were also the subject of existing contracts to sell with other buyers. While it may be that the petitioner is protected by Act No. 3135, as amended, it cannot claim any superior right as against the installment buyers. This is because the contract between the respondents is protected by P.D. No. 957, a social justice measure enacted primarily to protect innocent lot buyers.[33] Thus, in Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez,[34] the Court reiterated the rule that a bank dealing with a property that is already subject of a contract to sell and is protected by the provisions of P.D. No. 957, is bound by the contract to sell.[35]