This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2015-10-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| When a conflict exists between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the opinion of the court in the body of the decision, the former must prevail.[11] In Nery-Edwards v. Arce, we explained the reason for this: [T]he only portion of the decision that [becomes] the subject of execution is what is ordained or decreed in such dispositive part. Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and while they may serve as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi, what is controlling is what appears in the dispositive part of the decision.[12] | |||||
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2015-08-12 |
JARDELEZA, J. |
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| The DARAB's actions outside its jurisdiction cannot produce legal effects and cannot likewise be justified by the principle of immutability of final judgment.[64] | |||||
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2015-06-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred. x x x[26] | |||||
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2015-03-09 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In its Resolution[13] dated June 11, 2013, the CA granted the motion for entry of judgment and noted Hilongo's motion for clarification of Decision/Resolution. The CA held that when an appellate court affirms the Labor Arbiter's ruling, it is understood that awards due to the illegally dismissed employee shall be recomputed in order to account for the period of time that has lapsed from the rendition of the Labor Arbiter's decision up to its finality. The CA quoted this Court's ruling in Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals,[14] and Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation[15]:Consistent with what we discussed above, we hold that under the terms of the decision under execution, no essential change is made by a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.[16] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The decision's structure has given rise in certain instances to conflicts, or at the very least, to ambiguities that clouded the implementation of the decision. In Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation,[55] this Court laid down the rule when these instances occur: in a conflict between the body of the decision and its fallo or dispositive portion, the rule is:The resolution of the court in a given issue embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor in resolving the issues in a case. The fallo embodies the court's decisive action on the issue/s posed, and is thus the part of the decision that must be enforced during execution. The other parts of the decision only contain, and are aptly called, the ratio decidendi (or reason for the decision) and, in this sense, assume a lesser role in carrying into effect the tribunal's disposition of the case. | |||||
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2014-11-12 |
REYES, J. |
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| In Session Delights aptly quoted by the CA and reiterated in several cases including Nacar and Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation,[27] the Court was emphatic that: [N]o essential change is made by a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. | |||||
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2014-07-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| What the NLRC clearly and conveniently overlooked was the underlying issue of whether service charges are due from the specified entries/transactions, i.e., whether the specified entries/transactions are covered by the CBA's general-rule provisions on the collection of service charges or whether they are excepted because they fall within the excepted "Negotiated Contracts" and "Special Rates" or simply did not involve a "sale of food, beverage, etc." from which service charges are due. This understanding of this case's real issue is an indispensable requisite in the proper resolution of the controversy and a task that the NLRC, as a tribunal exercising quasi-judicial power, must perform with circumspection and utmost diligence. The patent failure led to its manifestly flawed conclusions that were belied by the underlying facts. By so doing, the NLRC acted outside the clear contemplation of the law.[26] | |||||
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2014-06-30 |
BRION, J. |
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| In Session Delights Ice Cream & Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals,[113] we explained that, pursuant to our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[114] a final decision becomes a judgment for money from which consequence flows the payment of legal interest of 12% in case of delay. We clarified in BPI Employees Union-Metro Manila v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,[115] that the payment of legal interest of 12% is a "natural consequence of a final judgment."[116] Thus, we held in Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation[.][117] that the principle of immutability of judgment is not affected. | |||||
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2013-11-13 |
BRION, J. |
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| As a final point, the CA's ruling must be modified to include legal interest commencing from the finality of the NLRC's July 31, 1998 decision. The CA failed to consider that the NLRC's July 31, 1998 decision, once final, becomes a judgment for money from which another consequence flows the payment of interest in case of delay.[45] Under the circumstances, the payment of legal interest of six percent (6%) upon the finality of the judgment is proper. It is not barred by the principle of immutability of judgment as it is compensatory interest arising from the final judgment.[46] | |||||