This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-11-11 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| As a rule, the death of a seafarer during the term of his employment makes his employer liable for death benefits. The employer, may, however, be exempt from liability if it can successfully establish that the seafarer's death was due to a cause attributable to his own willful act.[2] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Finally, although this Court commiserates with the respondent, absent substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, we are left with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice be caused to the employer. While it is true that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA Employment Contract must be construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.[29] | |||||
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2014-10-01 |
BRION, J. |
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| Two analogous cases may be cited in support of this conclusion. In Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. v. Leonila Surigao,[31] the seafarer was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room with a belt tied around his neck. In denying the claim for death benefits, the Court ruled that substantial evidence suffices for the employer to show that the seafarer committed suicide even if there was no eyewitness to its commission and the possibility of a contrary conclusion existed. In Crewlink, Inc. v. Teringtering,[32] the seafarer, who had already previously jumped in the open sea, jumped again, resulting in his death due to drowning. In holding that it was a case of suicide, the Court ruled that the employer "was able to substantially prove that [the seafarer's] death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea." | |||||
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2013-07-08 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| At the outset, it bears stressing that, in petitions for review on certiorari like the one at bench, the scope of this Court's judicial review of decisions of the CA is generally confined only to errors of law[16] and does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.[17] Whether Escudero has abandoned her job or was illegally dismissed are questions of fact better left for determination by quasi-judicial agencies[18] which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters.[19] Corollarily, the rule is settled that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded not only great respect but also finality, and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[20] Time and again, we have reiterated the dictum that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases.[21] | |||||