This case has been cited 2 times or more.
2013-10-23 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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Verily, it is a standing rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is merely provisional in nature and is integrally linked to the subsistence of the proceedings in the main case.[34] Stated differently, the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.[35] Thus, since the CA already remanded the case to the Ombudsman for the purpose of resolving Gabuya's pending motion for reconsideration, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it, absent any countervailing justification therefor, must be dissolved. In this relation, it is observed that the CA's issuance of the aforesaid writ was essentially hinged on the 2008 Samaniego ruling which, however, did not contain any pronouncement on the legal status of the writ issued in that case. The Court only remarked that the injunctive writ issued in Samaniego was a "mere superfluity" and, in fact, ordered the same to be "lifted" since the appeal of the Ombudsman's decision already had the effect of staying its execution.[36] In any case, the treatment of appeals of Ombudsman decisions had already been modified by the Court in the 2010 Samaniego ruling as above-explained. As such, the general postulate on writs of preliminary injunction, as above-discussed, must be applied. | |||||
2013-07-24 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites, namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.[25] |