This case has been cited 7 times or more.
2015-06-22 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[26] In this case, a credible eyewitness account established that accused-appellant, upon meeting Lumbera by the roadside, suddenly fired a sumpak against the latter, leaving him unable to defend himself or evade the attack. The assault on Lumbera ensured that accused-appellant would be able to consummate the crime without risk to his own person, hence, the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Finally, with regard to the use of an unlicensed firearm, a circumstance alleged in the information, the Court shall no longer delve upon its significance in this case, the same not having been appreciated by the courts a quo. | |||||
2013-11-13 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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As to the award of damages, we make the following modifications to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. The award by the trial court of P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim is increased to P75,000 which is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime which caused the victim's death.[38] We agree with the appellate court that the award of moral damages by the trial court should be increased from P10,000 to P50,000. This amount is awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim's heirs as a violent death necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family.[39] As to the award of exemplary damages, we increase the award made by the appellate court from P25,000 to P30,000.[40] The actual damages amounting to P25,000 as awarded by the trial court is sustained. | |||||
2013-07-31 |
REYES, J. |
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The awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, of the CA are all in accordance with existing jurisprudence[58] and are thus sustained. | |||||
2013-07-03 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accused-appellant Vergara constituted treachery qualifying the crime committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[33] | |||||
2013-06-03 |
REYES, J. |
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Second, in light of our ruling in People v. Malicdem[31] and People v. Laurio[32], the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of Efren is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, while the exemplary damages is increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. | |||||
2013-01-16 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellant's act of suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[28] Here, appellant surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked and stabbed him in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to protect himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. | |||||
2012-11-12 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellant's act of suddenly stabbing Wilson as he was about to leave constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[26] Here, appellant caught Wilson by surprise when he suddenly embraced him and proceeded immediately to plunge a knife to his chest. The swift turn of events did not allow Wilson to defend himself, in effect, assuring appellant that he complete the crime without risk to his own person. |