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PEOPLE OF PIIILIPPINES v. WENCESLAO NELMIDA

This case has been cited 12 times or more.

2015-09-09
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[24]
2015-08-05
PEREZ, J.
"There are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. 'The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim [with] no chance to resist or escape."'[42]
2015-07-15
PEREZ, J.
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida.[27] In the aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and seven counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of several acts.[28] The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.
2015-06-22
PERALTA, J.
Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held as inherently weak[34] and which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim.[35] In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given much weight relative to the affirmative testimony of the offended party.[36] The only exception to this rule is where there is no effective identification, or where the identification of the accused has been fatally tainted by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies.[37]
2015-02-18
DEL CASTILLO, J.
As regards appellant's defense of denial, suffice it to say that we have viewed this defense with disfavor for being inherently weak which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant committed the crime.[28]
2014-11-19
DEL CASTILLO, J.
On the other hand, all that appellant put forward for his defense was mere denial and the alibi that at the time of the incident, he went fishing, was back ashore in the afternoon, cooked some fish, went home and slept throughout the night.  "As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that [appellant] committed the crime.  For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that [appellant was] somewhere else when the crime happened.  [He] must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for [him] to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law."[22]  Obviously, the physical impossibility is not present in this case.  Appellant did not present any proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
2014-01-22
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In People v. Nelmida,[17] we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in this manner: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.  (Citation and emphasis omitted.)
2013-07-03
SERENO, C.J.
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa under paragraph 1(b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses,[41] all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission. Hence, the present Petition cannot withstand the tests for review as provided by jurisprudential precedent. While the designation of the circumstances attending the conviction for estafa could have been more precise, there is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts agree on the facts. We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.
2013-06-13
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The appeal of the accused-appellant boils down to a question of credibility of the prosecution's primary witness, the private complainant Mara. As a rule, however, credibility is the sole province of the trial court.[21] It is well-settled that: [W]hen the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. x x x.[22] (Citation omitted.)
2013-06-03
REYES, J.
Third, the civil indemnity awarded to Reah is reduced from P30,000.00 to P25,000.00, to conform to our ruling in People v. Adallom[33]. However, Reah is declared also entitled to P40,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, consistent with our ruling in People v. Nelmida[34] and People v. Punzalan[35].
2013-01-23
PEREZ, J.
The civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the Court of Appeals is in order.[40]  There is, however, a need to increase the award of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 to conform to existing jurisprudence.[41]  In addition, the victim's heirs shall be entitled to moral damages even in the absence of proof that they suffered mentally and emotionally[42] considering that "[a] violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family."[43]  A 6% interest on all the monetary awards for damages to be reckoned from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid shall likewise be imposed.[44]
2012-12-10
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
As to the surviving victims, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo, the Court of Appeals correctly granted each of them P40,000 moral damages for the physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries caused to them by the incident.[64] And as the crime was attended by aggravating circumstances, each of them was properly given P30,000 exemplary damages.[65]