This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2015-06-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Stated differently, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution.[40] Its issuance is, in fact, the trial court's ministerial duty, the only limitation being that the writ must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, more particularly, the orders or decrees in the dispositive portion of the decision.[41] Even the holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment can be considered abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.[42] | |||||
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2014-03-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Notwithstanding that the matter had already been submitted for resolution, Judge Pichay continued with the proceedings by setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably delaying the execution of the subject decision. Indeed, while it has been held that a presiding judge shall at all times remain in firm control of the proceedings, he is nevertheless mandated to adopt a policy against unwarranted delays.[45] In this case, Judge Pichay did not sufficiently explain the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the pending incidents on time, as well as to why he still had to set the same for hearing and repeatedly grant postponements therefor, either motu proprio or by motion, despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the ministerial nature of the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution. These considerations he should have been fully aware of. As case law instructs, "[e]jectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property,"[46] and that "it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory,"[47] as in Civil Case No. 2004-286. To add, the fact that Judge Pichay required medical attention on June 7, 2010 is no excuse for his default, considering that on such date, the subject motions were already due for resolution. [48] Thus, without having duly applied for any extension before the Court, Judge Pichay was bound to resolve the pending incidents in the said case within the three (3) month-period prescribed by the Constitution. This, he, however, failed to do, and, as such, the imposition of administrative sanctions against him remains in order. | |||||