This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-09-21 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| It being the fact that the PDIC should not be considered as a substitute or as a co-defendant of the petitioner bank but rather as a representative party or someone acting in fiduciary capacity, the insolvent institution shall remain in the case and shall be deemed as the real party in interest.[21] Nowhere in Section 3, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative is likewise deemed as the real party in interest.[22] The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title of the case. | |||||
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2015-06-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.[11] It has been held, however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not iron-clad rules. In the case of Republic v. Lacap,[12] the Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (1) in quo warranto proceedings.[13] | |||||
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2013-09-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff's caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.[12] | |||||
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2012-12-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit."[33] Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.[34] By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.[35] When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.[36] | |||||