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WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES v. ERNESTO C. TANAWAN

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

2015-01-28
REYES, J.
Further, Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tanawan[45] unequivocally reiterated that: What clearly determines the seafarer's entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days. Although the company-designated physician already declared the seafarer fit to work, the seafarer's disability is still considered permanent and total if such declaration is made belatedly (that is, more than 120 days after repatriation).[46] (Citations omitted)
2015-01-14
SERENO, C.J.
First, Montierro insists that the 120-day rule laid down in the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, and not the 240-day rule introduced by the 2008 case Vergara, applies to this case. Montierro cites the more recent cases Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., v. Tanawan,[25] Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Mesina,[26] and Valenzona v. Fair Shipping Corp.,[27] all of which applied the Crystal Shipping doctrine despite the fact that they were promulgated after Vergara.
2014-11-19
MENDOZA, J.
In his Comment,[19] Michael counters that the 120-day period in Valenzona[20] applies to him. He asserts what determines a seafarer's permanent disability is his inability to resume his customary work for a period of 120 days, notwithstanding any fit-to-work declaration or impediment rating issued by the company-designated physician, as has been fortified in the recent cases of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tanawan (Wallem Maritime Services),[21] and Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar (Kestrel Shipping).[22]  Michael adds that petitioners' reliance on the Vergara and Pacbasin cases, among others, was misplaced.
2014-09-17
BRION, J.
In Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc.,[30] we categorically declared that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his rights to the benefits by substantial evidence.[31]  We reiterated this ruling in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tanawan,[32] Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc.,[33] Crew and Ship Management International Inc. v. Soria,[34] Philman Marine Agency, Inc. v. Cabanban,[35] and Manota v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation,[36] to name a few.  In the case of a seafarer claiming entitlement to disability benefits under the provisions of the POEA-SEC, this burden of proof obviously lies with the seafarer.