This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2014-11-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr.,[23] however, We held that not all violations of RA 3019 require the application of the second mode for computing the prescription of the offense. There, this Court held that the second element for the second mode to apply, i.e. that the action could not have been instituted during the prescriptive period because of martial law, is absent. This is so since information about the questioned investment therein was not suppressed from the discerning eye of the public nor has the Office of the Solicitor General made any allegation to that effect. This Court likewise faulted therein petitioner for having remained dormant during the remainder of the period of prescription despite knowing of the investment for a sufficiently long period of time. | |||||
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2013-09-04 |
REYES, J. |
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| Hand in hand with Section 1, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 states that "prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr.[29] the Court ruled that Section 2 provides two rules for determining when the prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, if such commission is known; and second, from its discovery, if not then known, and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.[30] | |||||