This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-11-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| The present Constitution and RA 6770,[54] otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989," have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees.[55] Hence, as a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's findings and respects the initiative and independence inherent in its office, which "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service."[56] | |||||
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2014-07-30 |
REYES, J. |
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| The Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman, except in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has emphasized in Casing v. Ombudsman[20] the nature and extent of the powers, authority and findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, as we held: The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call. | |||||
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2014-06-02 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The long standing policy of the Court is non-interference in the powers given by no less than the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. Except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers on complaints filed against erring public officials and employees. Its findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Generally, in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.[9] The recent case of Conrado Casing vs. Hon. Ombudsman[10] is enlightening: The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call. | |||||
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2014-04-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In general, the Court follows a policy of non-interference with the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, in respect of the initiative and independence inherent in the said Office, which, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service."[43] The Court expounded on such policy in M.A. Jimenez Enterprises, Inc. v. Ombudsman,[44] thus: It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any person, any act or omission which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. As explained in Esquivel v. Ombudsman: | |||||
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2014-01-29 |
BRION, J. |
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| The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused.[24] It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.[25] What is merely required is "probability of guilt." Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.[26] Thus, in concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the very offense charged. | |||||
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2013-11-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner- which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law - in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.[21] | |||||
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2013-07-31 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[40] | |||||