This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-11-25 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Nonetheless, this Court has exercised its power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot and academic by supervening events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions, namely: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[28] | |||||
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2014-07-01 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.[36] | |||||
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2014-07-01 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.[42] Assuming that the petitioners' several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review. | |||||
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2013-11-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| It was in the year 2000[46] that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.[47] The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment[48] of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001. | |||||
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2013-02-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Here, the OSG does not dispute the justiciability and ripeness for consideration and resolution by the Court of the matter raised by the petitioner. Also, the locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit of this nature has already been settled in his favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law litigations he brought. In Funa v. Villar,[19] for one, the Court has held: To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thusly: | |||||