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ARMANDO ALILING v. JOSE B. FELICIANO

This case has been cited 27 times or more.

	GR No. 187691 2016-01-13	OLYMPIA HOUSING v. ALLAN LAPASTORA REYES, J.
The attainment of a regular status of employment guarantees the employee's security of tenure that he cannot be unceremoniously terminated from employment. "To justify fully the dismissal of an employee, the employer must, as a rule, prove that the dismissal was for a just cause and that the employee was afforded due process prior to dismissal. As a complementary principle, the employer has the onus of proving with clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence the validity of the dismissal."[31]
	GR No. 209418 2015-12-07	W.M. MANUFACTURING v. RICHARD R. DALAG VELASCO JR., J.
With the foregoing discussion, the burden now shifts to petitioner and Golden Rock to justify the legality of Dalag's dismissal, by proving that the termination was for just cause, and that the employee was afforded ample opportunity to be heard prior to dismissal.[72]
	GR No. 189229 2015-11-23	REYNALDO NOBLADO v. PRTNCESITA K. ALFONSO PERALTA, J.
In AJiling v. Feliciano,[34] this Court held that to effect a legal dismissal, the employer must show not only a valid ground therefor, but also that procedural due process has properly been observed.[35] When the Labor Code speaks of procedural due process, the reference is usually to the two-written notice rule envisaged in Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which provides: Section 2. Standard of due process.; requirements of notice. - In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed.
	GR No. 193990 2015-10-14	EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. JULIO C. CANJA PERALTA, J.
We, therefore, find the appellate court's computation of backwages and separation pay consistent with the provisions of law and jurisprudence. Where there is illegal dismissal, as in this case, and reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative.[24] The NLRC's award of separation pay at the rate of one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service has no basis.
	GR No. 168258 2015-08-17	RICARDO V. QUINTOS v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Quintos attributed bad faith on the part of NIDC and DBP when he averred that NIDC and DBP knew of Romualdez's scheme and acted in connivance with Romualdez by still approving and releasing the loans to GCFI. It is a basic principle that good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it. Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.[75] Quintos's testimony hardly constituted clear and convincing evidence of bad faith, not only because it was unsubstantiated, but it also lacked pertinent details. Quintos testified that he warned the "creditors" of GCFI of Romualdez's fraudulent scheme but did not identify which creditors, and if such creditors were corporations, who among the officers or employees of such corporations did he warn as to bind the corporations. Quintos likewise did not describe the manner by which he gave his warning. The fact that NIDC and DBP were warned and had knowledge of Romualdez's plan to divert the loan proceeds to his personal use needed to be established clearly and convincingly for it is determinative of the bad faith of NIDC and DBP if NIDC and DBP still released the loan proceeds despite said warning/knowledge.
	GR No. 215568 2015-08-03	RICHARD N. RIVERA v. GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE LEONEN, J.
As he was compelled to litigate in order to seek relief for the illegal and unjust termination of his employment, petitioner is likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award.[36]
	GR No. 175863 2015-02-18	NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. LUCMAN M. IBRAHIM PEREZ, J.
As a testament to its enduring quality, the foregoing pronouncement in Board of Liquidators had been reiterated in a slew of later cases,[52] more recently, in the 2009 case of Nazareno, et al. v. City of Dumaguete[53] and the 2012 case of Aliling v. Feliciano.[54]
	GR No. 198587 2015-01-14	SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. MA. JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO LEONEN, J.
Having been compelled to litigate to seek reliefs for their illegal and unjust dismissal, respondents are likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award.[130]
	GR No. 204944-45 2014-12-03	FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK v. ARLENE S. ESPIRITU LEONEN, J.
With regard to the award of attorney's fees, Article 111 of the Labor Code states that "[i]n cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered." Likewise, this court has recognized that "in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally justifiable."[255] Due to her illegal dismissal, Arlene was forced to litigate.
	GR No. 204651 2014-08-06	OUR HAUS REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. ALEXANDER PARIAN BRION, J.
It is settled that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally justifiable.[56] Moreover, under the PAO Law or Republic Act No. 9406, the costs of the suit, attorney's fees and contingent fees imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO.[57]
	GR No. 192571 2014-04-22	ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As a final point, Alcaraz cannot take refuge in Aliling v. Feliciano[12] (Aliling) since the same is not squarely applicable to the case at bar. The employee in Aliling, a sales executive, was belatedly informed of his quota requirement. Thus, considering the nature of his position, the fact that he was not informed of his sales quota at the time of his engagement changed the complexion of his employment. Contrarily, the nature of Alcaraz's duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager negates the application of the foregoing. Records show that Alcaraz was terminated because she (a) did not manage her time effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective rapport with them; (c) failed to train her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to obtain the knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case processing and article review which were necessary for the proper performance of her duties.[13] Due to the nature and variety of these managerial functions, the best that Abbott could have done, at the time of Alcaraz's engagement, was to inform her of her duties and responsibilities, the adequate performance of which, to repeat, is an inherent and implied standard for regularization; this is unlike the circumstance in Aliling where a quantitative regularization standard, in the term of a sales quota, was readily articulable to the employee at the outset. Hence, since the reasonableness of Alcaraz's assessment clearly appears from the records, her termination was justified. Bear in mind that the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is only substantial evidence which, as defined in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.[14] To the Court's mind, this threshold of evidence Abbott amply overcame in this case.
	GR No. 192571 2014-04-22	ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
On this point, I submit that Alcira v. NLRC,[23] far from advancing Abbott's position, in fact, supports this Dissent in the same manner that the case of Armando Aliling v. Jose B. Feliciano, et al.,[24] cited by Alcaraz, does.
	GR No. 191455 2014-03-12	DREAMLAND HOTEL RESORT v. STEPHEN B. JOHNSON REYES, J.
Accordingly, the award of backwages should be computed from November 3, 2007 to August 1, 2010 which is three years from August 1, 2007. Furthermore, separation pay is computed from the commencement of employment up to the time of termination, including the imputed service for which the employee is entitled to backwages.[42] As one-month salary is awarded as separation pay for every year of service, including imputed service, Johnson should be paid separation pay equivalent to his three-month salary for the three-year contract.
	GR No. 171482 2014-03-12	ASHMOR M. TESORO v. METRO MANILA RETREADERS ABAD, J.
Having been compelled to litigate to seek reliefs for their having been illegally and unjustly dismissed, petitioners are likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.[94]
	GR No. 184360 & 184361 2014-02-19	SILICON PHILIPPINES v. CIR VILLARAMA, JR., J.
case.[28]
	GR No. 186332 2013-10-23	PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. SPS. ERNESTO LOPEZ AND FLORENTINA LOPEZ BRION, J.
We are aware that the parties did not raise this issue in the pleadings. However, it is a settled rule that an appeal throws the entire case open for review once accepted by this Court. This Court has thus the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.[43]
	GR No. 185160 2013-07-24	POLYMER RUBBER CORPORATION v. BAYOLO SALAMUDING REYES, J.
In Aliling v. Feliciano,[31] the Court explained to wit: The CA held the president of WWWEC, Jose B. Feliciano, San Mateo and Lariosa jointly and severally liable for the monetary awards of Aliling on the ground that the officers are considered "employers" acting in the interest of the corporation. The CA cited NYK International Knitwear Corporation Philippines (NYK) v. National Labor Relations Commission in support of its argument. Notably, NYK in turn cited A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC.
	GR No. 192571 2013-07-23	ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some of the staff had disciplinary problems. Thus, she would reprimand them for their unprofessional behavior such as non-observance of the dress code, moonlighting, and disrespect of Abbott officers. However, Alcaraz's method of management was considered by Walsh to be "too strict."[14] Alcaraz approached Misa to discuss these concerns and was told to "lie low" and let Walsh handle the matter. Misa even assured her that Abbott's HRD would support her in all her management decisions.[15]
	GR No. 182072 2013-06-28	UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT v. WILLIAM M. SORIANO PERALTA, J.
To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer must, as a rule, prove that the dismissal was for a just cause and that the employee was afforded due process prior to dismissal.[34] We find no reason to depart from the CA conclusion that respondent's termination from employment is without just and valid ground. Neither was due process observed, making his termination illegal. He is, therefore, entitled to the twin relief of reinstatement and backwages granted under the Labor Code.[35] However, as aptly held by the CA, considering the strained relations between petitioner and respondent, separation pay should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. This Court has consistently ruled that if reinstatement is no longer feasible, backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal dismissal until the date the decision becomes final.[36] Separation pay, on the other hand, is equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher (with a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year),[37] computed from the time of employment or engagement up to the finality of the decision.[38]
	GR No. 182072 2013-06-28	UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT v. WILLIAM M. SORIANO PERALTA, J.
To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer must, as a rule, prove that the dismissal was for a just cause and that the employee was afforded due process prior to dismissal.[34] We find no reason to depart from the CA conclusion that respondent's termination from employment is without just and valid ground. Neither was due process observed, making his termination illegal. He is, therefore, entitled to the twin relief of reinstatement and backwages granted under the Labor Code.[35] However, as aptly held by the CA, considering the strained relations between petitioner and respondent, separation pay should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. This Court has consistently ruled that if reinstatement is no longer feasible, backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal dismissal until the date the decision becomes final.[36] Separation pay, on the other hand, is equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher (with a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year),[37] computed from the time of employment or engagement up to the finality of the decision.[38]
	GR No. 182957 2013-06-13	ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA FACULTY ASSOCIATION -FUR CHAPTER-TUCP v. VS.ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA REYES, J.
The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the employee's service while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.[24] In this case, the SOLE and the CA were one in ruling that there was no illegal dismissal committed by SJAV against the non-licensees. As both stressed by the SOLE and the CA, R.A. No. 7836 provides that no person shall engage in teaching and/or act as professional teacher unless he is a duly registered professional teacher, and a holder of a valid certificate of registration and a valid professional license or a holder of a valid special/temporary permit.[25] Obviously, aside from the finding that there was no illegal dismissal, the non-licensees cannot be reinstated since they do not possess the necessary qualification for them to be engaged in teaching and/or act as professional teachers. This conclusion binds the Court, especially in the absence of any circumstance that militates against such conclusion. The rule is that the findings of fact of the SOLE and the CA and the conclusions derived therefrom are generally binding on the Court if amply supported by evidence on record.[26]
	GR No. 193756 2013-04-10	VENANCIO S. REYES v. RP GUARDIANS SECURITY AGENCY MENDOZA, J.
In the case of Aliling v. Feliciano,[23] citing Golden Ace Builders v. Talde,[24] the Court explained: Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.
	GR No. 173189 2013-02-13	JONATHAN I. SANG-AN v. EQUATOR KNIGHTS DETECTIVE BRION, J.
(c) A written notice [of] termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.[21]
	GR No. 199547 2012-09-24	NEW PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS v. FRANCISCO N. DAKILA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Similarly, the Court finds no basis to hold petitioner Jennifer M. Eñano-Bote, President and General Manager of The New Philippine Skylanders, Inc., jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the payment of the monetary awards. The mere lack of authorized or just cause to terminate one's employment and the failure to observe due process do not ipso facto mean that the corporate officer acted with malice or bad faith.[15] There must be independent proof of malice or bad faith which was not established in this case. Perforce, petitioner Jennifer M. Eñano-Bote cannot be made personally liable for the liabilities of the corporation which, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders and members. Moreover, for lack of factual and legal bases, the awards of moral and exemplary damages cannot also be sustained.[16]
	GR No. 193789 2012-09-19	ALEX Q. NARANJO v. BIOMEDICA HEALTH CARE VELASCO JR., J.
And in line with prevailing jurisprudence,[44] petitioners are entitled to nominal damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 each for Biomedica's violation of procedural due process.
	GR No. 186169 2012-08-01	MYLENE CARVAJAL v. LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK PEREZ, J.
Truly, it is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.[18]