This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2016-01-12 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Petitioners Bayan et al. also claim[129] that their co-petitioners who are party-list representatives have the standing to challenge the act of the Executive Department, especially if it impairs the constitutional prerogatives, powers, and privileges of their office. While they admit that there is no incumbent Senator who has taken part in the present petition, they nonetheless assert that they also stand to sustain a derivative but substantial injury as legislators. They argue that under the Constitution, legislative power is vested in both the Senate and the House of Representatives; consequently, it is the entire Legislative Department that has a voice in determining whether or not the presence of foreign military should be allowed. They maintain that as members of the Legislature, they have the requisite personality to bring a suit, especially when a constitutional issue is raised. | |||||
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2015-09-01 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Cognizant that the foregoing view is a betrayal of the principles laid down by the Court in Mendoza, Justice Velasco now clamors for a "modification" or an abandonment of our ruling in the said case insofar as how it applied the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.[30] Justice Velasco cautions the Court that pursuing Mendoza's interpretation of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules is bound to lead to absurd and illogical results - such as one wherein a decision of a COMELEC division in an election case can simply be overturned by the COMELEC en banc even though the latter is not able to reach a majority vote.[31] | |||||
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2015-04-07 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| It has been said that "[a] cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application."[116] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| This approach, read with the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation (i.e., that an instrument should, as a first rule, be read in accordance with the plain meaning that its words import[108]) cannot but lead us to the conclusion that the Risos-Vidal's "third Whereas Clause" objection should be thrown out for lack of merit. | |||||
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2013-10-17 |
REYES, J. |
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| By such haste of the NLRC in peremptorily denying the respondents' motion without considering the respondents' arguments, it effectively denied the respondents of their opportunity to seek a reduction of the bond even when the same is allowed under the rules and settled jurisprudence. It was equivalent to the NLRC's refusal to exercise its discretion, as it refused to determine and rule on a showing of meritorious grounds and the reasonableness of the bond tendered under the circumstances.[83] Time and again, the Court has cautioned the NLRC to give Article 223 of the Labor Code, particularly the provisions requiring bonds in appeals involving monetary awards, a liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.[84] The NLRC's failure to take action on the motion to reduce the bond in the manner prescribed by law and jurisprudence then cannot be countenanced. Although an appeal by parties from decisions that are adverse to their interests is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it is an essential part of our judicial system. Courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[85] Considering the mandate of labor tribunals, the principle equally applies to them. | |||||
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2013-01-09 |
BRION, J. |
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| Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution[31] protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.[32] It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage. | |||||