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ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 181293 2015-02-23	ANA THERESIA “RISA” IVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD SERENO, C.J.
This matter has already been settled by the Court in Francisco, Jr. v. TRB,[102] which ruled thus: It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC.
	GR No. 209287 2014-07-01	MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III BERSAMIN, J.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.[34]
	GR No. 208566 2013-11-19	GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.[120] This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute."[121] In other words, "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."[122] Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."[123] "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."[124]
	GR No. 201112 2012-06-13	ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
Petitioners fault the Comelec in totally disregarding the recommendation of the Comelec Advisory Council (CAC) not to exercise the OTP. They point out that in its Resolution No. 2012-2003, the CAC resolved to recommend that the Comelec should exert all efforts to procure the necessary AES only through public bidding. The CAC likewise allegedly recommended that the OTP should not be exercised if as a consequence, the rest of the system must come from the same vendor as the Comelec would lose the opportunity to look for better technology; would prevent the Comelec from taking advantage of the best possible technology available; would prevent other prospective vendors from competitively participating in the bidding process; and may erode the public trust and confidence in the electoral process. In its report to the Congressional Oversight Committee after the 2010 elections, the CAC supposedly concluded that the Comelec does not need to use the same PCOS machines and that the Comelec would be better off not exercising the OTP the PCOS machines so it can look for an even better solution for the May 2013 elections.[22] Like the other petitioners, it is their position that Comelec Resolution No. 9376 is totally null and void having been issued in violation of the express provisions of RA 9184 and the AES contract. According to petitioners, the Comelec itself provided in its bid bulletins for a fixed and determinate period, and such period ended on December 31, 2010. Thus, Smartmatic-TIM could not have unilaterally extended the option period and the Comelec could not have also given its consent to the extension. In extending the option period, it is tantamount to giving the winning bidder a benefit that was not known and available to all bidders during the bidding of the 2010 AES, which is a clear violation of the bidding rules and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.[23] Considering that the option period already expired, the purchase of the PCOS machines requires competitive public bidding. Lastly, petitioners claim that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in opting to buy the PCOS machines and allied paraphernalia of Smartmatic-TIM for the 2013 elections, despite incontrovertible findings of the glitches, malfunctions, bugs, and defects of the same.[24]
	GR No. 177130 2011-06-07	EDUARDO ERMITA IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY v. JENNY LIND R. ALDECOA-DELORINO CARPIO MORALES, J.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. [6] Thus, even if the petition was denominated as one for prohibition, public respondent did not err in treating it also as one for certiorari and taking cognizance of the controversy.