This case has been cited 17 times or more.
2015-09-08 |
BRION, J. |
||||
The reason is that just compensation would not be “just” if the State does not pay the property owner interest on the just compensation from the date of the taking of the property. Without prompt payment, the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income. The owner’s loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-generating potential.[339] | |||||
2015-06-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
Eminent domain refers to the inherent power of the State to take private property for public use. This power has two basic limitations: (1) the taking must be for public use; and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the property taken.[39] Notably, in agrarian reform cases, the taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers is considered to be one for public use.[40] Anent just compensation, the same is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property expropriated. The term "just" qualifies the word "compensation" because the return deserved by the owner of the property must be real, substantial, full and ample.[41] | |||||
2015-04-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-movants as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. This principle was plainly laid down in Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[14] to wit:x x x In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, a valuation case under our agrarian reform law, this Court had occasion to state: | |||||
2015-02-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest[s] on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. We subsequently upheld Republic's 12% per annum interest rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation in the following cases: Reyes v. National Housing Authority, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, Republic v. Court of Appeals, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial, Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc, and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[17] | |||||
2013-12-03 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare.[58] The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive.[59] In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method of accomplishing the goal.[60] Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government."[61] The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary."[62] Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property for public use.[63] The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the payment of just compensation.[64] | |||||
2013-06-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
||||
In fine, given the special and compelling reasons as above-discussed, the Court finds it appropriate to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice. In Twin Towers Condominium Corp. v. CA,[51] the Court held that the merits of the case may be regarded as a special or compelling reason to relax procedural rules. Likewise, in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[52] special and compelling reasons constitute recognized exceptions to the rule on immutability of judgment, viz: As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice and where special and compelling reasons for such actions. (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
2013-04-11 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
The opposition of Fortunato to the subject petition in intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon was joined by his successor, Marlou B. Ubano (Ubano), Gov. Manuel L. Enage, Jr. of IBP-Eastern Visayas,[30] and the members of the House of Delegates of IBP-Western Visayas.[31] Nasser A. Marohomsalic (Marohomsalic),[32] one of the original parties in this case, Gov. Leonor Gernoa-Romeo[33] of IBP-Bicolandia, and the IBP-BOG [34] likewise filed their respective comments. | |||||
2013-02-18 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
Relevantly, the likelihood of the aggregate interest charged exceeding the principal indebtedness is not remote. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[60] a case involving just compensation for landholdings with legal interest, however, the Court has appropriately observed that the realization of such likelihood was not necessarily inequitable or unconscionable due to its resulting directly from the application of law and jurisprudence, to wit: That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to be paid is not per se an inequitable or unconscionable situation, considering the length of time the interest has remained unpaid almost twelve long years. From the perspective of interest income, twelve years would have been sufficient for the petitioners to double the principal, even if invested conservatively, had they been promptly paid the principal of the just compensation due them. Moreover, the interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable and unconscionable because it resulted directly from the application of law and jurisprudence standards that have taken into account fairness and equity in setting the interest rates due for the use or forbearance of money. | |||||
2012-10-03 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
The Court, in Republic, recognized that "the just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State."[61] In fixing the interest rate at 12%, it followed the guidelines on the award of interest that we enumerated in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[62] to wit: I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages. | |||||
2012-09-18 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
Verily, "under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land."[28] This rule notwithstanding, the Court En Banc had re-opened and accepted several cases for review and reevaluation for special and compelling reasons. Among these cases were Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque,[29] Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[30] League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,[31] and Navarro v. Ermita.[32] | |||||
2012-06-27 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
The Court is not unaware that current jurisprudence sets the interest rate for delay in payments in agrarian cases at 12% per annum.[32] In the case at bar, however, the respondents did not contest the interest awarded by the lower courts and instead asked for the affirmance in toto of the appellate court's decision.[33] In keeping with the demands of due process, therefore, the Court deems it fit not to disturb the interest rate imposed by the courts below. | |||||
2011-11-22 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it limited the maximum area to be covered to 4,915.75 hectares, whereas the area that should, at the least, be covered is 6,443 hectares,[26] which is the agricultural land allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco).[27] | |||||
2011-11-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[7] | |||||
2011-08-24 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations upon this inherent right of the State to take private property, namely: (a) that the taking must be for a public purpose; and (b) that just compensation must be paid to the owner. The State must first establish that the exercise of eminent domain is for a public purpose, which, here, is already settled. What remains to be determined is the just compensation. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank,[19] the Court has held that compensation cannot be just to the owner in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is prompt payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred.[20] | |||||
2011-08-24 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
Accordingly, we hereby impose 12% interest per annum on the unpaid gross value of P81,331,600.00 for Lot 1406-B (i.e., 13,118 square meters x P6,200.00/square meter) from August 23, 1993, the date of the approval of the failed Compromise Agreement, until the full amount of the just compensation is paid, as a way of making the compensation just. This accords with a long line of pertinent jurisprudence,[23] whereby the Court has imposed interest at 12% per annum in eminent domain whenever the expropriator has not immediately delivered the just compensation. | |||||
2011-08-24 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
[45] Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727; Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214; Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc, G.R. No. 173392, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 198; Land Bank v. Imperial, G.R. No. 157753, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 449; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147245, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 516; Land Bank v. Wycoco, G.R. No. 140160, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 67; Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 494; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 611; Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78. | |||||
2011-07-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
On August 31, 2010, the Court, in a bid to resolve the dispute through an amicable settlement, issued a Resolution [84] creating a Mediation Panel composed of then Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, as chairperson, and former CA Justices Hector Hofileña and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, as members. Meetings on five (5) separate dates, i.e., September 8, 9, 14, 20, and 27, 2010, were conducted. Despite persevering and painstaking efforts on the part of the panel, mediation had to be discontinued when no acceptable agreement could be reached. |