Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

KUKAN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. AMOR REYES

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 203355 2015-08-18	LEO R. ROSALES v. NEW A.N.J.H. ENTERPRISES VELASCO JR., J.
The application of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon. However, this Court will not hesitate to disregard the corporate fiction if it is used to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime is committed against another in disregard of his rights.[39]
	GR No. 178169 2015-01-12	NFF INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. G & L ASSOCIATED BROKERAGE & GERARDO TRINIDAD PERALTA, J.
Finally, with regard to the liability of respondent Trinidad, we adopt with approval the findings of the RTC that he was merely being sued in his capacity as General Manager of respondent company.[67] Since there was no showing of any of circumstances warranting the piercing the veil of corporate fiction, he cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the outstanding obligation of respondent company.[68] As held in Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes,[69] citing an earlier case, those who seek to pierce the veil must clearly establish that the separate and distinct personalities of the corporations are set up to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or perpetrate a deception, to wit:The same principle was the subject and discussed in Rivera v. United Laboratories, Inc.:
	GR No. 194062 2013-06-17	REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION v. PETRON CORPORATION PERALTA, J.
In sum, this Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of petitioners for trademark infringement and unfair competition, considering that petitioner Republic Gas Corporation, being a corporation, possesses a personality separate and distinct from the person of its officers, directors and stockholders.[12] Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through whose act, default or omission the corporation commits a crime, may themselves be individually held answerable for the crime.[13] Veritably, the CA appropriately pointed out that petitioners, being in direct control and supervision in the management and conduct of the affairs of the corporation, must have known or are aware that the corporation is engaged in the act of refilling LPG cylinders bearing the marks of the respondents without authority or consent from the latter which, under the circumstances, could probably constitute the crimes of trademark infringement and unfair competition. The existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally caused the corporation to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot hide behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of the corporation to escape criminal liability. A corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present and efficient actor.[14]
	GR No. 184333 2013-04-01	SIXTO N. CHU v. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION PERALTA, J.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.[14]
	GR No. 182378 2013-03-06	MERCY VDA. DE ROXAS v. OUR LADY’S FOUNDATION SERENO, J.
This argument does not persuade us, for any piercing of the corporate veil has to be done with caution.[25] Save for its rhetoric, petitioner fails to adduce any evidence that would prove OLFI's status as a dummy corporation. In this regard, we recently explained in Sarona v. NLRC[26] as follows: A court should be mindful of the milieu where it is to be applied. It must be certain that the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was committed against another, in disregard of rights. The wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established; it cannot be presumed. Otherwise, an injustice that was never unintended may result from an erroneous application. (Citation omitted)
	GR No. 166282 2013-02-13	HEIRS OF FE TAN UY v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK MENDOZA, J.
It behooves this Court to emphasize that the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon and can only be done if it has been clearly established that the separate and distinct personality of the corporation is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or perpetrate a deception.[31] As aptly explained in Philippine National Bank v. Andrada Electric & Engineering Company:[32]
	GR No. 168208 2012-06-13	VIVIAN T. RAMIREZ v. MAR FISHING CO. SERENO, J.
Neither can the veil of corporate fiction between the two companies be pierced by the rest of petitioners' submissions, namely, the alleged take-over by Miramar of Mar Fishing's operations and the evident similarity of their businesses. At this point, it bears emphasizing that since piercing the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon, those who seek to pierce the veil must clearly establish that the separate and distinct personalities of the corporations are set up to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or perpetrate a deception.[38] This, unfortunately, petitioners have failed to do. In Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union vs. Calica, we ruled thus:[39]
	GR No. 192813 2012-01-18	VASHDEO GAGOOMAL v. SPS. RAMON AND NATIVIDAD VILLACORTA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Therefore, petitioner's contention that the writ of possession had already been enforced and can no longer be quashed deserves scant consideration. Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over the entire execution process, and such authority carries with it the right to determine every question which may be invariably involved in the execution.[31] Respondents invoked this supervisory power when they sought the quashal of the writ of possession.